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INTRODUCTION

During the Survey year,1 the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed
many criminal law issues. This Article will summarize the most
significant of these cases and analyze the court's reasoning in each
decision. This Article also will review significant criminal law statutes enacted during the Survey period.
II.

CASE LAW

A. The State's Burden of Proof
1. Absence of Direct Evidence
In People v. Thompkins, 2 the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the3
defendant's conviction and death sentence for numerous offenses
despite the absence of direct evidence against him.4 A jury convicted Willie Thompkins of multiple counts of murder 5 for the execution-style shooting of Gerald Holton and Arthur Sheppard. The
court subsequently sentenced Thompkins to death.6
1. The Survey year encompasses the period from July 1, 1987, to July 1, 1988.
2.' 121 Ill. 2d 401, 521 N.E.2d 38 (1988).
3. Id. at 457, 521 N.E.2d at 63.
4. Id. at 451-52, 521 N.E.2d at 60.
5. Id. at 412, 521 N.E.2d at 42. The jury also convicted Thompkins of multiple
counts of felony murder, armed violence, aggravated kidnaping, armed robbery, concealment of homicide, obstructing justice, solicitation to commit armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit murder and armed robbery. Id.
6. Id. at 412-13, 521 N.E.2d at 42. Initially, a grand jury indicted Willie Thompkins,
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In addition to raising numerous procedural issues, 7 Thompkins
argued on appeal that the trial court improperly applied the death
penalty to him because his accomplice killed the victims.' In rejecting this argument, the court recognized the absence of any direct evidence showing that the defendant shot the victims 9 but
inferred the defendant's intent to kill from the testimony of two
key witnesses. 10
Furthermore, the court found the evidence sufficient to convict
the defendant under the theory of accountability."I It also recognized that even though the defendant may not have actually shot
the victims, the evidence revealed that Thompkins planned and ac12
tively participated in armed robbery, murder, and concealment.
Consequently, the supreme court affirmed the trial
court and or13
dered the defendant executed by lethal injection.
Pamela Thompkins, and Ronnie Moore for the slaying of Holton and Sheppard. Upon
the defendant's motion, however, the court severed his case from that of his sister-in-law,
Pamela Thompkins. Id. at 413, 521 N.E.2d at 42.
7. For a discussion of the procedural issues challenged by Thompkins, see Carey &
Feeley, CriminalProcedure, 20 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 391, 408 (1989).
8. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d at 450-53, 521 N.E.2d at 60-61. Thompkins also contended
that the death penalty was inappropriate because his character was one of a hard-working
family man who was forced to leave his full-time employment because of sarcoidosis, a
rare and incurable respiratory disease. Id. at 450, 521 N.E.2d at 60.
9. Id. at 452, 521 N.E.2d at 60.
10. Id. The court relied on the testimony of its principal witness, Sandra Douglas,
who was the only occurrence witness to the crimes. Id. at 451-52, 521 N.E.2d at 60. She
testified that she saw the defendant point a gun at the victims. Id. at 451, 521 N.E.2d at
60. The court further relied on witness Keith Culbreath's testimony that the defendant
invited him to commit an armed robbery. Id. at 451, 521 N.E.2d at 60. Finally, the
court considered the statement made by Pamela Thompkins to Sandra Douglas that
showed that Pamela previously had discussed murdering the victims with the defendant.
Id. at 451-52, 521 N.E.2d at 60.
11. Id. at 452, 521 N.E.2d at 60. The principle of accountability is codified in article
V of the Criminal Code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 5-1 to 5-5 (1987). Paragraph 5-2
provides in pertinent part:
A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:
(c) either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to
promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 5-2(c) (1987).
The court stated that the issue of whether it could constitutionally impose the death
penalty when a defendant's conviction was based on accountability and no evidence existed that indicated that the defendant actually killed or intended to kill the victim was
decided previously. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d at 456, 521 N.E.2d at 62 (citing People v.
Garcia, 97 Ill. 2d 58, 454 N.E.2d 274 (1983)).
12. Thompkins, 121 I11.2d at 452, 521 N.E.2d at 60. The court referred specifically
to the testimony of Keith Culbreath and Sandra Douglas. Id. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
13. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d at 457, 521 N.E.2d at 63. Justice Simon dissented with his
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Absence of Physical Evidence

In People v. Hernandez,4 the Illinois Supreme Court considered
whether the trial court properly convicted the defendant when
neither physical evidence nor witnesses linked the defendant to any
of the crimes.I 5 The trial court convicted Alejandro Hernandez of
numerous crimes 6 for the abduction, rape, and murder of tenyear-old Jeanine Nicarico."7
On appeal, the defendant contended that the court can sustain a
conviction based on a confession only when the confession was independently corroborated by physical evidence.18 He argued that
because there was no direct physical evidence linking him to the
crimes, the evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' 9
The court rejected Hernandez's argument, however, and explained that the defendant misapplied the corroboration rule. °
The court reiterated that the corroboration rule demanded only
"proof of the corpus delicti committed consistently with the defrequently-asserted objection to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute. Id. at
469, 521 N.E.2d at 68 (Simon, J., dissenting). He also criticized the majority's analysis
of several of the defendant's procedural challenges. Id. at 457-69, 521 N.E.2d at 63-68
(Simon, J., dissenting). See Carey & Feeley, Criminal Procedure,20 Loy. U. CHi. L.J.
391, 408 (1989).
14. 121 I11.
2d 293, 521 N.E.2d 25, cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 177 (1988).
15. Id. at 299-300, 521 N.E.2d at 28.
16. Id. at 295, 521 N.E.2d at 26. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted
of murder, residential burglary, aggravated kidnaping, aggravated indecent liberties, deviate sexual assault, and rape. Id.
17. Id. at 295, 521 N.E.2d at 26. The defendant was indicted with two codefendants,
Steven Buckley and Rolando Cruz. The trial court convicted both Hernandez and Cruz
on all counts except home invasion which, upon the State's motion, was nol-prossed. Id.
See supra note 16 for a list of the charges. The court was unable to similarly convict
Buckley because the jury was unable to find him guilty on the same charges. Hernandez,
121 Ill. 2d at 295, 521 N.E.2d at 26.
18. Hernandez, 121 I11.
2d at 319, 521 N.E.2d at 37. The defendant relied on People
v. Willingham, 89 111. 2d 352, 359, 432 N.E.2d 861, 864 (1982). Hernandez, 121 Ill. 2d at
319, 521 N.E.2d at 37. The defendant interpreted Willingham to require independent
physical evidence to corroborate a conviction based on a confession. Id.
19. Hernandez, 121 Ill. 2d at 319, 521 N.E.2d at 37. None of the many fingerprints
found in the Nicarico home could be linked to the defendant. Id. at 305, 521 N.E.2d at
30-31. Further, although the police seized and investigated the defendant's clothes and
shoes, the State offered no evidence suggesting that it discovered blood on the defendant's
clothes or found prints matching those of his shoes near the body or on the Nicarico
property. Id. at 305, 521 N.E.2d at 31.
20. Id. at 319, 521 N.E.2d at 37. The defendant assumed that to. corroborate a confession the State must demonstrate proof of physical evidence connecting the defendant
to the crime. The court, however, stated that there was no requirement of physical evidence connecting the defendant to the crime. Id. (citing People v. Taylor, 58 Ill. 2d 69,
317 N.E.2d 97 (1974); People v. Norcutt, 44 Ill. 2d 256, 255 N.E.2d 442 (1970)).
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fendant's admission of guilt."'" The court concluded that the corroboration requirement was satisfied because
the crimes confessed
22
and charged were actually committed.
Although the court found the evidence sufficient to support the
defendant's convictions, the court reversed the convictions and vacated the defendant's sentence23 because it concluded that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.24
3.

Disproving Voluntary Manslaughter Defenses

In People v. Reddick,25 the court consolidated the appeals of two
defendants, Stephen Reddick and Gregory Lowe, and defined the
State's burden of proof in a murder prosecution in which the accused raised a voluntary manslaughter defense.26 The defendant
Reddick was convicted of murder. 27 The other defendant, Lowe,
was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and aggravated battery in a separate trial. 28 After separate appeals to the intermediate

state courts were taken,29 the supreme court granted the State leave

21. Id. The court believed that four pretrial statements made by the defendant in
which he acknowledged his participation were sufficient to establish his complicity. The
statements contained varying accounts of the crimes and were inconsistent with the
known facts. Id. at 305, 521 N.E.2d at 31. The prosecution presented no witnesses to
any of the crimes. Id. at 319, 521 N.E.2d at 27.
22. Id. The defendant did not deny that the crimes were, in fact, perpetrated. Id.
Additionally, the defendant argued that the evidence did not prove his involvement beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 318-19, 521 N.E.2d at 37. The defendant presented two
theories. First, he claimed that he lied in his statements in order to obtain reward money.
Second, he suggested that several of the witnesses had motives to fabricate stories and
were thus incredible. Id. at 319, 521 N.E.2d at 37. On this issue, the court deferred to the
jury's judgment and concluded that the evidence was not so weak that it left a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt. Id. at 320, 521 N.E.2d at 37. The court refused to
disregard the witnesses' testimony, believing that the "jury [could] reach a more informed
judgment of their credibility than this court can achieve from reading the transcript of
[the] proceedings." Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 318, 521 N.E.2d at 37. The court held that the admission of improperly
and insufficiently redacted statements made by a non-testifying codefendant deprived
Hernandez of his sixth amendment right to confront adverse witnesses. Id. at 309, 521
N.E.2d at 38. For an in-depth discussion of the procedural issues in this case, see Carey
& Feeley, Criminal Procedure, 20 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 391, 416 (1989).
25. 123 Ill. 2d 184, 526 N.E.2d 141 (1988).
26. Id. at 195, 526 N.E.2d at 145. See infra note 42 for the text of the voluntary
manslaughter statute.
27. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d at 188, 526 N.E.2d at 142.
28. Id. at 189, 526 N.E.2d at 142.
29. Id. at 188-89, 526 N.E.2d at 142. The appellate courts differed in their approaches to the waiver issue in these cases. The Third District noted Reddick's failure to
object during trial to jury instructions that allocated the parties' burdens of proof,
deemed the issue waived, and affirmed the conviction in an unpublished order. Id. at 188,
526 N.E.2d at 142. The First District reversed Lowe's convictions after it considered the
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to appeal and consolidated the cases for review.3°
At trial, the State proved the death of Reddick's roommate and
homosexual lover, whom the police found dead in the home that
the two men shared.31 In a post-arrest statement to police officers,
Reddick said that he killed the victim after they smoked marijuana, drank heavily, and quarreled.32 At trial, however, Reddick
claimed that he killed the victim in self-defense.33
In the second case, the State prosecuted Lowe for the murder
and attempted murder of Larry and Gilbert Chaney. 34 Lowe also
presented a theory of self-defense at trial.35 He testified that he
shot the victims after being repeatedly threatened with death and
sexual abuse by Larry Chaney. 36 However, the testimony of several prosecution witnesses who were in the home at the time of the
shooting contradicted the defendant's account.37 The witnesses
stated that they did not see the victim physically abuse or threaten
the defendant, but rather that the activity between the two men
same instructions and found "grave error" that could not be waived. Id. The supreme
court ultimately reviewed the merits of both appeals under the plain error exception to
the waiver rule. Id. at 198, 526 N.E.2d at 147.
30. Id. at 189, 526 N.E.2d at 142.
31. Id. The police found the naked victim dead on the floor. The physical evidence
indicated a violent struggle, and the victim had been stabbed many times. The police
found the defendant lying on a bed in an upstairs bedroom. Id. at 189, 526 N.E.2d at
142-43.
32. Id. at 189-90, 526 N.E.2d at 143. The defendant stated: "I started stabbing him,
and I couldn't stop." Id. at 190, 526 N.E.2d at 143. Reddick also told the police officers
that he attempted suicide when he realized what he had done. Id.
33. Id. He testified that the decedent called him racially insulting names. He alleged
that the decedent suddenly pulled a steak knife from the bedside table, lunged at the
defendant's chest, dropped the knife and ran from the room. When the decedent ran
toward the kitchen, the defendant believed he was getting another knife. He followed
him to the kitchen and grabbed a knife before the decedent could reach one. Id. The
defendant remembered holding a knife and seeing the body fall, although he did not
remember stabbing the decedent. Id. at 190-91, 526 N.E.2d at 143.
34. Id. at 191, 526 N.E.2d at 143.
35. Id.
36. Id. According to Lowe, Larry and Gilbert were in his home when he awoke from
a nap. Lowe told Larry that he was not welcome in his home and he and Larry called
each other names. Larry then pulled a bucket on which Lowe was sitting out from under
him and kicked him. Larry got on top of Lowe. When Larry reached as if to hit him
with a bottle, a mutual friend took the bottle and pulled Larry away. The defendant went
upstairs and Larry followed him, threatening sexual abuse and death. Larry returned
downstairs but continued to make threats against the defendant. After the defendant
unsuccessfully tried to summon the police, he placed a gun in his pocket and went downstairs to leave the house. Larry threatened him and again grabbed a bottle as if to hit
him. The defendant shot Larry and then shot Gilbert when he saw Gilbert coming at
him with a shiny object in hand. Id. at 191-92, 526 N.E.2d at 143-44.
37. Id. at 191-93, 526 N.E.2d at 144.
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appeared to be "playing, joking and fun and games. "38
The court examined the jury instructions given at the defendants' trials. 39 The pattern jury instructions tracked the language of
the statutes then in force."° The trial judge, in each case, gave the
jury an instruction that defined the elements of murder.4" The juries also received voluntary manslaughter instructions, however,
that required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either a
sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by
another or that the defendant unreasonably believed that the circumstances justified killing the victim.42
The court readily concluded that if the burden was placed on the
State to prove the elements of voluntary manslaughter beyond a
reasonable doubt, then a jury sworn to hear a murder case would
never return a verdict for the lesser crime of voluntary manslaughter.4 3 In a murder prosecution, the State denies the existence of a
mitigating mental state. The defendant, not the State, must establish the requisite mental state for voluntary manslaughter." The
court held that when a defendant charged with murder asserts an
unreasonable belief of justification or serious provocation, the State
does not bear any burden of proof with respect
to those matters to
45
obtain a voluntary manslaughter conviction.
The court next examined the State's burden of proof in a murder
38. Id. at 192, 526 N.E.2d at 144.
39. Id. at 193-95, 526 N.E.2d at 144-45.
40. Id. at 193, 526 N.E.2d at 144.
41. Id. at 193-94, 526 N.E.2d at 144-45. The jury was told that "[a] person who kills
an individual without lawful justification commits murder if, in performing the acts
which cause death ...[h]e knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to that individual or another." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
9-1(a)(2)(1985).
42. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d at 194, 526 N.E.2d at 145. The former voluntary manslaughter statute provided in pertinent part:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and
intense passion resultingfrom serious provocation by: (1) The individual killed,
or (2) Another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed. Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.
(b) A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to
be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the
principles stated in Article 7 of this Code [use of force in defense of person], but
his belief is unreasonable.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-2 (1985) (emphasis added).
43. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d at 194-95, 526 N.E.2d at 145.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 195, 526 N.E.2d at 145.
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conviction. 46 The court looked at the definition of an affirmative
defense47 and concluded that the defenses of serious provocation
and an unreasonable belief in self-defense are affirmative defenses
to murder.4 8 The accused must present some evidence to raise one
of these defenses. If he succeeds in doing so, then the State acquires an additional burden to disprove that issue.49 The court
concluded that if a defendant in a murder trial presents sufficient
evidence to raise issues that would reduce the charge of murder to
voluntary manslaughter, then the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that those defenses are without merit in addition to
statutory elements of murder. 50
The court noted that its holding was limited because the legislature had since replaced the voluntary manslaughter statute with
the second degree murder statute5 for crimes committed after December 31, 1986.52 Under the legislative amendments, the defendant bears the burden of proof for these mitigating mental states.53
46. Id.
47. Id. at 195-96, 526 N.E.2d at 145-46. Section 3-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961
provides in pertinent part:
Affirmative defense.
(a) "Affirmative defense" means that unless the State's evidence raises the issues involving the alleged defense, the defendant, to raise the issue, must present
some evidence thereof.
(b) If the issue involved in an affirmative defense, other than insanity, is raised
then the State must sustain the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt as to that issue together with all the other elements of the offense. If the affirmative defense of insanity is raised, the defendant bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence his insanity at the time of the
offense.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-2 (1987)(emphasis added).
48. Reddick, 123 I11.2d at 196, 526 N.E.2d at 146.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 197, 526 N.E.2d at 146. The court found support for its position in the
Criminal Code of 1874, which placed the burden of proving circumstances to excuse a
homicide on the accused unless the evidence suggested manslaughter. Id. See ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 373 (1874).
51. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-2 (1987) for the provisions of the second
degree murder statute. The amendment to the Criminal Code became effective July 1,
1987.
52. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d at 197, 526 N.E.2d at 146.
53. Id. The court also decided that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Reddick's manslaughter defenses were meritless. Id. at 199-201, 526
N.E.2d at 148. To discredit Reddick's claim of sudden passion, the court specifically
relied on evidence that a few days prior to the killing Reddick said that he would "have
to use the knives" if the decedent asked him to move out of the home. Id. at 200, 526
N.E.2d at 148. The court also rejected the suggestion that Reddick reasonably believed
he was acting in self-defense, relying primarily on evidence of repeated stab wounds. Id.
at 201, 526 N.E.2d at 148.
In Lowe's appeal, the court reversed the attempt murder and aggravated battery con-
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After considering a number of other issues raised on appeal by the
defendants, the court remanded both cases for new trials. 54
B.

Challenges to the Sufficiency of the Evidence
1. Home Invasion/Residential Burglary

In People v. Simms, 5 the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the
defendant's convictions for the sexual assault and murder of Lillian
LaCrosse, a woman who lived in an apartment building adjoining
the defendant's residence.56 Specifically, the court considered the
sufficiency of the evidence for the defendant's convictions of home
invasion and residential burglary.57
The defendant contended that the State failed to prove that he
was guilty of home invasion and residential burglary because it
failed to prove that he entered the victim's apartment without authorization.5 " In a custodial statement, the defendant claimed that
he and the victim were having an affair and that he entered the
victions as well because it found other instructional error. Id. at 201-02, 526 N.E.2d at
148-49.
54. Id. at 204, 526 N.E.2d at 149.
55. 121 Ill. 2d 259, 520 N.E.2d 308 (1988).
56. Id.
57. Id, at 269-71, 520 N.E.2d at 312-13. The trial court also convicted the defendant
of aggravated criminal sexual assault and armed robbery. Id. at 262-63, 520 N.E.2d at
309. The armed robbery conviction was based on the defendant's admission that he took
the victim's purse and movie camera when he left her apartment. Id. at 265, 520 N.E.2d
at 310. He claimed that he took them because he thought he may have left his fingerprints on them during a prior visit with LaCrosse. Id.
The defendant challenged his murder conviction, claiming that the trial court denied
him a fair trial by allowing the State to refer to the victim's family in closing arguments.
Id. at 267-68, 520 N.E.2d at 311. The court concluded that the references to the victim's
family during the bench trial were proper and inevitable considering the nature of the
evidence. Id. at 268-69, 520 N.E.2d at 312. The court also relied on prior case law
supporting the attorney's broad discretion in closing arguments and the trial judge's discretion in determining the character and scope of the argument. Id. at 269, 520 N.E.2d
at 312 (citing People v. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d 111, 131, 492 N.E.2d 1303, 1310 (1986)
(quoting People v. Smothers, 55 Ill. 2d 172, 176, 302 N.E.2d 324, 327 (1973))). Finally,
the court recognized that its prior decisions affirmed convictions despite incidental references to the victim's family. Id.
58. Id. at 269, 520 N.E.2d at 312. Unauthorized entry is an element of the burglary
and home invasion statutes. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-11 (1987) (home invasion); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para 19-1 (1987) (burglary).
The defendant relied on the absence of any proof that he forced his way into LaCrosse's apartment. Simms, 121 Ill. 2d at 269-70, 520 N.E.2d at 312. Guided by the
decision in People v. Holman, 103 Ill. 2d 133, 469 N.E.2d 119 (1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1220 (1985), the court readily dismissed the significance that the defendant attached
to the absence of proof of a forced entry. Simms, 121 Ill. 2d at 270, 520 N.E.2d at 312.
In Holman, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the absence of physical signs of forced
entry does not necessarily indicate that an entry was consented to. Holman, 103 Ill. 2d at
133, 469 N.E.2d at 119.
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victim's apartment on the evening in question upon her invitation.5 9 Although he admitted killing the victim, Simms claimed
that he acted in self-defense.'
The court weighed the evidence of consensual entry against a
strong inference of unauthorized entry. 61 It inferred from the evidence that the defendant entered the victim's apartment by deception.62 The court relied on physical evidence of a blood stain on
the front door, evidence of defense wounds on the victim's hands,
and testimony from the victim's husband that the defendant had
been harassing his wife for several months. 63 Accordingly, the
court found that the evidence that the victim consented to the entry was weak. 64
Further, the court stated that the trial judge was entitled to
doubt the credibility of the defendant's unsubstantiated claim of
authorized entry. 65 Specifically, the testimony of both of the victim's parents contradicted that of the defendant, making his story
implausible.66 The court also doubted the defendant's credibility
because previously he presented two other false accounts of his activities on the morning after the crime.67
59. Simms, 121 Il. 2d at 265, 520 N.E.2d at 310. The defendant argued that the
victim, a wife and mother of three, voluntarily admitted him into her apartment near
midnight after her husband left for work. Id. at 263-65, 520 N.E.2d at 309-10.
60. Id. at 265, 520 N.E.2d at 310. Shortly after his arrest, the defendant told a police
officer that after the victim let Simms into her apartment, he fondled her. Id. at 264-65,
520 N.E.2d at 310. When he told her that he had to leave, the victim became upset. Id.
at 265, 520 N.E.2d at 310. The defendant claimed that she stabbed him in the leg with a
knife and that in the struggle, he stabbed her in the neck. When she screamed, he choked
her until she became unconscious. He wiped her body with a towel to remove any fingerprints. Simms then stabbed her in the neck and throat at least 10 times, attempting to
eliminate the chance of being identified. Id.
61. Id. at 270-71, 520 N.E.2d at 312-13.
62. Id. at 270, 520 N.E.2d at 313. The court stated that a power outage at the time
of the incident may have facilitated the defendant's deceptive entry into LaCrosse's apartment. Id. at 264, 520 N.E.2d at 310. The Commonwealth Edison personnel arrived at
about 9:30 p.m. and worked outside the victim's apartment until about 1:45 a.m. Id. at
263, 520 N.E.2d at 309. During this outage, the hallways were lit by dim emergency
lights and the outer door to the building was open to facilitate the workers' access. Id. at
270, 520 N.E.2d at 309.
63. Id. at 270-71, 520 N.E.2d at 312-13.
64. Id. at 270, 520 N.E.2d at 313.
65. Id. at 270-71, 520 N.E.2d at 313.
66. Id. at 270, 520 N.E.2d at 313. The defendant claimed that he and the victim had
sexual intercourse during the afternoon on the day that he killed her. Id. However, both
of the victim's parents testified that they spent the entire day with the victim and her
three children. Id. Although the victim's whereabouts in the afternoon were not directly
relevant to the defendant's crime, the court used the contradictory evidence to discount
the defendant's overall credibility. Id. at 270-71, 520 N.E.2d at 313.
67. Id. A police officer testified that the defendant offered three different accounts to
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The court determined that the trial judge could reasonably conclude from the State's evidence that the defendant entered the victim's apartment without authorization.6" The court thus affirmed
the convictions for home invasion and residential burglary.6 9
2.

Murder: Mental State

In People v. Foster,7 ° the supreme court affirmed the defendant's
murder conviction for the brutal attack, sexual assault, and murder
of his girlfriend, Jacqueline Simmons.7 ' The attack occurred over
a period of several hours in the presence of the victim's roommate
and the defendant's friend.7 2 The defendant yelled and cursed at
the victim, accusing her of infidelity.7 3 He threw her to the
ground, kicked her, and struck her with a bat on the head, and on
her arms, legs, and back. 74 The trial court convicted the defendant
of murder and imposed the death sentence.7 5
On appeal, the defendant contended that the evidence presented
at trial indicated that his conduct was not intentional, but reckless,
due to his intoxicated, drugged condition and jealous state at the
time of the crime. 6 He argued that the trial court's refusal to give
explain a cut on his right thigh. Id. at 264-65, 520 N.E.2d at 310. First, the defendant
claimed that he had injured himself cutting potatoes. Id. at 264, 520 N.E.2d at 310.
When the officer questioned the likelihood of that explanation, the defendant said that he
had been stabbed during a fight in Chicago. Id. Finally, after the officer informed the
defendant that his brother told the police that the defendant had stabbed the victim, the
defendant offered his third story and admitted killing the victim in self-defense. Id. at
264-65, 520 N.E.2d at 310.
68. Id. at 271, 520 N.E.2d at 318.
69. Id. Although the court affirmed the home invasion, residential burglary, and
murder convictions, it reversed and remanded the defendant's death sentence for a resentencing hearing for several reasons. First, the court concluded that the harmless error
doctrine should not be used in death penalty hearings involving alleged constitutional
errors. Id. at 275, 520 N.E.2d at 315. Second, the court found that the State failed to
meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim impact evidence did
not affect the trial judge's decision to impose the death penalty. Id. For a detailed
discussion of this issue, see Carey & Feeley, Criminal Procedure, 20 Loy. U. CH1. L.J.
391, 397 (1989).
70. 119 Ill. 2d 69, 518 N.E.2d 82 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2044 (1988).
71. Id. at 90, 518 N.E.2d at 91.
72. Id. at 76-78, 518 N.E.2d at 84-85.
73. Id. at 76, 518 N.E.2d at 84.
74. Id. at 76-77, 518 N.E.2d at 84-85. The autopsy revealed that the victim suffered
injuries to her head, chest, abdomen, and legs. Id. at 78, 518 N.E.2d at 85. The coroner
noted that her brain was swollen and her liver was lacerated, which caused bleeding into
the abdominal cavity. Id. The coroner testified that the victim died from multiple blunt
trauma, which led to brain swelling and internal hemorrhage of the liver. Id.
75. Id. at 75, 518 N.E.2d at 84.
76. Id. at 87, 518 N.E.2d at 89. Theresa Williams, the victim's roommate and the
State's key witness, testified that Foster left twice, once returning from the liquor store
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an involuntary manslaughter instruction denied him a fair trial.17
The court relied on precedent that forbids an involuntary manslaughter instruction when the evidence clearly suggests murder. 8
The court reasoned that the primary difference between involuntary manslaughter and murder is the accompanying mental state.7 9
The court relied on a literal interpretation of the statutes8° and on
precedent explaining that the requisite intent for murder is established when a defendant voluntarily commits an act that would
normally tend to cause death or great bodily harm."1
The court reasoned that the evidence did not support the defendant's contention that his actions were merely reckless and not inwith wine, beer, and gin. Id. at 76-77, 518 N.E.2d at 84-85. Later, he left with his friend
for a 20-minute visit to a tavern. Id. at 77, 518 N.E.2d at 85.
Williams also testified that as the defendant struck the victim with the bat, he accused
her of "messing around." Id. at 76, 518 N.E.2d at 84. He badgered the victim to admit
that she was having sexual relations with others, and then took her into the bathroom to
determine from an examination of her underclothes whether she had recently engaged in
sexual relations with another man. Id.
77. Id. at 87, 518 N.E.2d at 89. The defendant also raised several arguments on
appeal challenging the constitutionality of the Illinois Death Penalty Act and the prosecutor's abuse of discretion in seeking a death sentence in this case. Id. at 90-91, 518
N.E.2d at 91. The court held that it could not properly conclude that the prosecutor's
decision to ask for the death penalty was not based on the presence of a statutory aggravating factor and the likelihood that the sentencing authority would consider a death
sentence appropriate. Id. at 93, 518 N.E.2d at 92. It thus concluded that the prosecutor
did not abuse his discretion in seeking the death penalty. Id.
78. Id. at 87, 518 N.E.2d at 89 (citing People v. Simpson, 74 Ill. 2d 497, 501, 384
N.E.2d 373, 374 (1978); People v. Sanders, 56 Ill. 2d 241, 253, 306 N.E.2d 865, 872, cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 972 (1974)). The court recognized, however, that a manslaughter instruction defining the lesser crime is appropriate when the record demonstrates some
evidence that, if believed, would reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 87-88, 518 N.E.2d at 89-90. The first degree murder statute provides that
the accused has the requisite mental state for murder when:
(1) He either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or
another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another;
or
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or
(3) He is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree
murder.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(a) (1987).
The involuntary manslaughter statute provides that "[a] person who unintentionally
kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his
acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause
death or great bodily harm to some individual and he performs them recklessly." ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-3(a)(1987).
81. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d at 88, 518 N.E.2d at 90 (citing People v. Cannon, 49 111. 2d 162,
166, 273 N.E.2d 829, 831 (1971); People v. Latimer, 35 Ill. 2d 178, 182-83, 220 N.E.2d
314, 317 (1966)).
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tentional. 82 The court focused on the defendant's admission that
he deliberately beat the victim with a baseball bat numerous times
and on the severity of the injuries inflicted.8 3 Finally, although the
court recognized that an intoxicated or drugged state might support a finding of recklessness, 4 the court found no evidence in the
record that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the beating.85 The court concluded that the trial court did not err in refusing the tendered instruction. 6 The court affirmed the trial court's
murder conviction and ordered Foster executed by lethal
injection. 7
C. Interpretationof the Elements of an Offense
1. Kidnaping: Secret Confinement
In People v. Enoch,"8 the supreme court reviewed, among numerous procedural issues,89 the sufficiency of the evidence for the defendant's convictions of aggravated kidnaping and attempted
82. Id.
83. Id. at 88, 518 N.E.2d at 90. A pathologist testified that the victim's jaw was
fractured, her brain was swollen, and her head and body were covered with bruises. Id.
Theresa Williams, the victim's roommate, described the brutality that she saw the defendant inflict on the victim. Id. at 75-77, 518 N.E.2d at 84-85. He threw her on the
floor, struck her with his hands, kicked her and beat her with a baseball bat on her legs,
arms and back. Id. at 76-77, 518 N.E.2d at 84-85. He inserted the bat in her rectum and
later "bragged" how far he had inserted the bat handle. Id. at 77-78, 518 N.E.2d at 8485.
84. Id. at 88, 518 N.E.2d at 90 (citing People v. Wright, 111 Ill. 2d 18, 488 N.E.2d
973 (1986)(the defendant asserted his mental state was recklessness, not intent)). The
relevant statute provides that "[a] person who is in an intoxicated or drugged condition is
criminally responsible for his conduct unless such condition either: (a) Is so extreme as
to suspend the power of reason and render him incapable of forming a specific intent
which is an element of the offense." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 6-3(a)(1987).
85. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d at 88, 518 N.E.2d at 90. See supra note 76 for a description of
the record references to the defendant's use of alcohol.
86. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d at 88, 518 N.E.2d at 90.
87. Id. at 105, 518 N.E.2d at 98. In dissent, Justice Simon found that significant
errors occurred at both the trial and the sentencing hearing. Id. at 106-10, 518 N.E.2d at
98-100 (Simon, J., dissenting). For these reasons, he would have remanded the case for a
new trial. Id. at 110, 518 N.E.2d at 100 (Simon, J., dissenting).
88. 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988).
89. The court limited the review of procedural issues to those that were properly
raised at trial including the defendant's claim that his constitutional right against selfincrimination had been violated, id. at 192-94, 522 N.E.2d at 1132-33; the defendant's
challenge to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute, id. at 202-03, 522 N.E.2d at
1137-38; and the defendant's claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance, id. at 20102, 522 N.E.2d at 1137. The defendant raised other issues that the court refused to review because defense counsel failed to raise them on a post-trial motion. Id. at 190-92,
522 N.E.2d at 1131-32.
In dissent, however, Justice Simon characterized the consequences that the majority
attached to the defendant's failure to file a post-trial motion as a "new rule." Id. at 204,

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 20

rape. 90 The jury convicted the defendant of murder, aggravated
kidnaping, attempted rape, and two counts of felony murder that
were based on the charges of aggravated kidnaping and attempted
rape. 9 1

The evidence revealed that the defendant approached the victim,
Amanda Kay Bums, at the hospital where she was employed just
as she was leaving to go home. 92 The victim and the defendant
walked several blocks together to her apartment.9" After they entered the apartment, the defendant stabbed and killed her. 94
First, the defendant argued that the aggravated kidnaping conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. 9 Specifically, he
claimed that the State failed to establish the elements of secrecy
and confinement that are essential to support an aggravated kidnaping conviction.96 The defendant argued that because witnesses
saw him enter the victim's apartment with her and because he did
not overtly conceal the victim's location from anyone, he did not
secretly confine the victim. 97
522 N.E.2d at 1139 (Simon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He believed
the majority's ruling on this issue contradicted the court's previous position. Id.
90. Id. at 194-98, 522 N.E.2d at 1134-35.
91. Id. at 180-81, 522 N.E.2d at 1127. Illinois law provides that one who kills an
individual while "attempting or committing a forcible felony other than voluntary manslaughter" can be charged with felony murder. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (a)(3)
(1987). In 1983, the Code provided that "forcible felony means treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, robbery,
burglary, arson, kidnaping, aggravated battery and any otherfelony which involves the use
or threat of physical force against any individual." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 2-8
(1983)(emphasis added). The defendant's aggravated kidnaping and attempted rape
charges supported two findings of felony murder. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 181, 522 N.E.2d
at 1127.
92. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 181, 522 N.E.2d at 1127.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 183, 522 N.E.2d at 1128.
95. Id. at 194, 522 N.E.2d at 1134.
96. Id. at 195, 522 N.E.2d at 1134. Illinois law provides that "[k]idnaping occurs
when a person knowingly... [a]nd secretly confines another against his will, or (2) [b]y
force or threat of imminent force carries another from one place to another with intent
secretly to confine him against his will." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-1(a)(1987).
The aggravated kidnaping statute provides in pertinent part: "A kidnaper within the
definition of paragraph (a) of Section 10-1 is guilty of the offense of aggravated kidnaping
when he .. .(3) [i]nflicts great bodily harm or commits another felony upon his victim
...." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-2(a)(1987).
97. Enoch, 122 Il1. 2d at 195, 522 N.E.2d at 1134. Testimony at trial from several of
the victim's co-workers at the hospital indicated that the defendant entered the victim's
office at the hospital and spoke briefly with the victim. Id. at 181, 522 N.E.2d at 1127.
Two witnesses testified that they saw the victim and the defendant walking together toward the victim's apartment after she left work. Id. One witness saw the victim with the
defendant within 100 feet of the victim's apartment. Id.
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Nevertheless, the court held that the facts at trial sufficiently established that the defendant secretly confined the victim. 9 The
court reasoned that the secrecy element may be proved by evidence
of either the secrecy of the confinement or the secrecy of the place
of the confinement. 99 The court concluded that in this case both
e
the confinement and the place of confinement were secret. oo
In so concluding, the court relied on testimony that revealed
that no one knew that the victim and the defendant were in the
apartment even though two witnesses saw them walking toward
her apartment.10 1 Derek Proctor, the victim's boyfriend, who expected to meet the victim after work, 10 2 testified that he spent at
least forty-five minutes trying to determine whether the victim was
in her apartment.1 0 3 Proctor was, in fact, uncertain that the victim
was inside her apartment until he saw the defendant leave the
apartment almost one hour after Proctor first arrived. 104 The court
concluded that no one knew that the defendant and the victim
were inside her apartment. 0 5 Thus, the evidence sufficiently
demonstrated that the defendant secretly confined the victim. 10 6
The defendant next argued that the State failed to prove that he
restrained the victim in the apartment.'
The court rejected this
argument, relying on evidence that the defendant tied the victim's
hands behind her back with wire during the attack. 0 8 The court
further inferred from evidence of the victim's blood in several
rooms and on the telephone that the victim attempted to escape
98. Id. at 195-96, 522 N.E.2d at 1134.
99. Id. at 195, 522 N.E.2d at 1134 (citing People v. Mulcahey, 72 111. 2d 282, 285, 381
N.E.2d 254, 256 (1978); People v. Kleba, 110 Ill. App. 3d 345, 357, 442 N.E.2d 605, 613
(1st Dist. 1982)).
100. Id. The court explained that a victim can be as secretly confined in her own
home as in an isolated location. Id. (citing Mulcahey, 72 Ill. 2d at 285, 381 N.E.2d at
256).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 186, 522 N.E.2d at 1127-28.
103. Id. at 195, 522 N.E.2d at 1134. During this period, he telephoned the victim's
apartment, rang the door bell several times, and knocked on the windows. Id. at 181-82,
522 N.E.2d at 1128. Neither the defendant nor the victim responded to either the telephone calls or the ringing of the doorbell. Id.
The evidence showed that after the defendant initially rang the victim's doorbell and
got no response, he walked to the hospital where the security guard informed him that
the victim had left. Id.
104. Id. at 195-96, 522 N.E.2d at 1134.
105. Id. at 196, 522 N.E.2d at 1134.
106. Id.
107. Id. See supra note 96 for the text of the kidnaping statute.
108. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 196, 522 N.E.2d at 1134.
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but was prevented.109
The defendant also contended that the evidence failed to support
his conviction for attempted rape because it did not prove the specific intent to rape beyond a reasonable doubt.°10 The court stated
that it may infer the requisite, specific intent from the circumstances of the assault. 11 The court noted that Illinois courts consistently have held that evidence of an assault with concomitant
disrobing supported an attempted rape conviction. 12 Hence, the
court concluded that the evidence
reasonably supported the finding
3
of intent to commit rape."

In a lengthy dissent, Justice Simon criticized the majority's expansive definition of aggravated kidnaping." 4 He argued that the
confinement of the victim was incidental to the murder and thus
could not supply the basis for the defendant's aggravated kidnaping conviction." 5 Justice Simon suggested that the court distinguish between secret confinements that implicate the kidnaping
statute and those that are merely incidental to an underlying felony." 6 He rejected the Model Penal Code's assumption that the
distinction relates to the length of the asportation or the distance. "I He also rejected the Code's description of a "substantial"
asportation or period of confinement." 8 Justice Simon concluded
that a conviction for kidnaping should be affirmed only when the
confinement is not inherent in the substantive crime.'
The confinement should increase the risk to the victim and substantially
109. Id.
110. Id. at 197, 522 N.E.2d at 1135. The Criminal Code provides in relevant part
that "[a] person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense, he
does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-4 (1987).
111. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 197, 522 N.E.2d at 1135 (citing People v. Triplett, 46 111. 2d
109, 112, 263 N.E.2d 24, 26 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971); People v. Williams,
128 Ill. App. 3d 384, 396, 470 N.E.2d 1140, 1149 (4th Dist. 1984)).
112. Id. at 198, 522 N.E.2d at 1135 (citing People v. Bonner, 37 Ill. 2d 553, 562, 229
N.E.2d 527, 533 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 910 (1968); People v. Williams, 128 Ill.
App. 3d 384, 396-97, 470 N.E.2d 1140, 1149 (4th Dist. 1984)).
113. Id. Derek Procter found the victim on the bedroom floor with her hands tied.
Id. at 182, 522 N.E.2d at 1128. Her blouse and jacket had been pulled down around her
arms and she was naked from the waist down. Id. at 198, 522 N.E.2d at 1135. There was
also evidence that the victim was gagged. Id.
114. Id. at 216-21, 522 N.E.2d at 1144-46 (Simon, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 219, 522 N.E.2d at 1145 (Simon, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 220, 522 N.E.2d at 1145-46 (Simon, J., dissenting).
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facilitate the commission of the other offense. 120
2.

Felony Theft: Prior Conviction as an Element

In People v. Hicks,' the Illinois Supreme Court examined
122
whether, under the terms of an enhancement provision statute,
the State must prove a defendant's prior theft conviction during
the trial's evidentiary phase as a necessary element of the offense of
felony theft. 12 3 The trial court convicted Terry Hicks of burglary
and theft and sentenced 2him
to concurrent prison terms. 124 The
5
appellate court affirmed.

On appeal, the defendant contended that the admission of his
prior theft conviction during the evidentiary phase of the trial was
improper. 26 He maintained that the court should not have allowed proof of his prior theft conviction to have been introduced at
trial because it was not an element of the offense of
felony theft and
27
concerned only the severity of the punishment.
Over a strong dissent by Chief Justice Clark, 28 the court rejected the defendant's argument. 29 Instead, the court held that
unless otherwise provided, when a prior theft conviction statutorily
120. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
121. 119 Ill. 2d 29, 518 N.E.2d 148 (1987).
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16-1(e)(1)(1987). The statute provides that:
Theft of property, other than a firearm, not from the person and not exceeding
$300 in value is a Class A misdemeanor. A second or subsequent offense after a
conviction of any type of theft, including retail theft, other than theft of a firearm, is a Class 4 felony.
Id.
The legislature subsequently amended this statute and clarified the question raised in
the case. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16-1(e)(2)(1987)(a prior conviction is not an
element of the offense).
123. Hicks, 119 Ill. 2d at 30-31, 518 N.E.2d at 149.
124. Id. at 30, 518 N.E.2d at 149.
125. People v. Hicks, 150 Ill. App. 3d 242, 243, 501 N.E.2d 1027, 1028 (5th Dist.
1986).
126. Hicks, 119 Ill. 2d at 30, 518 N.E.2d at 149.
127. Id. at 31, 518 N.E.2d at 149. Consequently, Hicks argued that the prior convictions should have been considered only at the sentencing hearing and not during the
evidentiary phase of the trial. Id. at 30, 518 N.E.2d at 149. To support his argument,
Hicks relied significantly upon People v. Hayes, 87 Ill. 2d 95, 429 N.E.2d 490 (1981).
Hicks, 119 Ill. 2d at 31, 518 N.E.2d at 149. In Hayes, the court suggested that in order to
elevate a retail theft conviction from a misdemeanor to a felony, proof of a prior retail
theft conviction need not be alleged in an information or proved at trial. Hayes, 87 Ill. 2d
at 98, 429 N.E.2d at 491. In Hicks, the defendant contended that admission of evidence
of a prior conviction may have caused the jury to infer that the defendant committed the
crime in the case at bar. Hicks, 119 Ill. 2d at 31, 518 N.E.2d at 149. He asserted that the
admission of the evidence may have prejudiced the jury. Id.
128. Hicks, 119 Ill. 2d at 35-41, 518 N.E.2d at 151-54 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 31-35, 518 N.E.2d at 149-51.
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elevates a subsequent offense to a felony, the State must allege and
prove the prior conviction during the evidentiary phase of the
trial.

130

In its analysis, the court noted a recent amendment to the current theft statute.1 3 1 The amendment provides that although an
information or indictment must allege the prior conviction, it will
not be considered an element of the offense of felony theft and
should not be disclosed to the jury during trial.13 2 The court suggested that the legislature's amendment of the statute indicated the
absence of the provision's implied or prior existence.13 3 The court
reasoned that an amendatory change in language creates a presumption that it was intended to change the former law. 134 Consequently, the court concluded that the statute that applied to the
defendant logically must have provided that the prior conviction
was an element of the offense. 35 Thus, the court affirmed the de130. Id. at 32, 518 N.E.2d at 149. The Hicks court relied on People v. Palmer, its
most recently decided case on point. Id. at 31-33, 518 N.E.2d at 149-50. According to
the court, Palmer merely "reaffirmed a long line of cases." Id. at 32, 518 N.E.2d at 149
(citing People ex rel. Carey v. Pincham, 76 Ill. 2d 478, 480, 394 N.E.2d 1043, 1044
(1979); People v. Edwards, 63 Ill. 2d 134, 138, 345 N.E.2d 496, 498 (1976); People v.
Owens, 37 Ill. 2d 131, 132, 225 N.E.2d 15, 16 (1967); People v. Ostrand, 35 Ill. 2d 520,
529, 221 N.E.2d 499, 505 (1966), overruled in part on other grounds, People v. Bracey, 51
Ill. 2d 514, 283 N.E.2d 685 (1972)).
The Hicks court also relied on Palmerto specifically discredit the defendant's emphasis
on Hayes. Id. at 32-33, 518 N.E.2d at 150. Further, the comments in Hayes that proof of
a prior conviction need only be presented at sentencing and not to the jury were expressly
dismissed as dicta by both the Palmer and Hicks courts. Id.
The court also rejected the defendant's reliance on People v. Jackson, 99 Ill. 2d 476,
459 N.E.2d 1362 (1984), for the proposition that the value of a stolen item is not an
element of the offense when the value is used to elevate the theft from a misdemeanor to a
felony. Hicks, 119 Ill. 2d at 33-34, 518 N.E.2d at 150. The defendant's analogy to Jackson was misplaced because the issue in Jackson was only whether value was an element
for the specific purpose of determining whether the defendant should be allowed a retroactive application of a statutory amendment raising the value demarcation of stolen property. Id. Thus, the Hicks court concluded that Jackson did not properly provide
authority for the defendant's contention that a prior conviction was not an element of the
felony theft offense. Id. at 34, 518 N.E.2d at 150.
131. Hicks, 119 Ill. 2d at 34, 518 N.E.2d at 150. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
16-1(e)(2)(1987)(effective January 1, 1988).
132. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16-1(e)(2) (1987). This amendment also provided
that value is an element of the offense of theft that must be proved during the evidentiary
phase of trial. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16-1(e)(4) (1987).
133. Hicks, 119 Ill. 2d at 34, 518 N.E.2d at 151 (citing Western Nat'l Bank v. Village
of Kildeer, 19 Ill. 2d 342, 354, 67 N.E.2d 169, 175 (1960)).
134. Id. (citing People v. Nunn, 77 Ill. 2d 243, 248, 396 N.E.2d 27, 29 (1979)).
135. Id. at 34-35, 518 N.E.2d at 151. The court noted that this statutory amendment
did not affect the law as applied to the defendant because statutory amendments are given
only prospective application. Id. (citing Stigler v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill. 2d 20, 24, 268
N.E.2d at 26, 28 (1971)).
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3
fendant's conviction.1

6

In his dissent, Chief Justice Clark proposed that the majority's
interpretation of the statute improperly would allow a jury to convict a defendant based on prior, similar crimes. 37 Chief Justice
statuClark also criticized the majority's reliance on subsequent
3
tory amendments to interpret prior legislative intent.1
3. Armed Robbery: Force or Threat of Force
In People v. Holland,19 the supreme court upheld the defendant's armed robbery conviction based on the sufficiency of the evidence. '4 The trial court convicted Daniel Holland of rape, deviate
sexual assault, aggravated kidnaping, and armed robbery for the
The appellate court
sexual assault and robbery of a teenager.'
136. Id. at 35, 518 N.E.2d at 151.
137. Id. (Clark, C.J., dissenting). Specifically, he suggested that the majority's reliance on Palmer and on the recent amendment were misplaced. Id. at 36-41, 518 N.E.2d
at 150 (Clark, C.J., dissenting). In distinguishing Palmer,Chief Justice Clark argued that
when determining whether a jury should be exposed to a defendant's prior record, the
critical variable is the relationship between the charged offense and the prior offense. Id.
at 37, 518 N.E.2d at 152 (Clark, C.J., dissenting). When the charged offense and the
prior offense are similar, he reasoned, a jury is likely to prejudge the defendant's propensity to commit the charged offense. Id. (Clark, C.J., dissenting). The prior offense in the
Palmer statute could consist of any prior felony; the charged offense was the unlawful
use of weapons. Id. (Clark, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Chief Justice Clark concluded that the prior offense and the charged offense were not so similar that a defendant
would likely be prejudiced by the admission of the prior offense. Id. (Clark, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Clark contrasted this to the theft enhancement statute, in which the
prior crimes and the charged offense were identical. Id. (Clark, C.J., dissenting). Based
on this fundamental dissimilarity between the statutes at issue in this case and in Palmer,
he rejected the majority's reliance on Palmer. Id. at 37-38, 518 N.E.2d at 152 (Clark,
C.J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 39-41, 518 N.E.2d at 153-54 (Clark, C.J., dissenting). Justice Simon joined
Chief Justice Clark's dissent based on his agreement with this argument. Id. at 41, 518
N.E.2d at 154 (Simon, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Clark reasoned that because the legislature is a collective organization of 118 individuals who may each view a statutory provision differently, it is difficult to ascertain legislative intent. Id. at 39, 518 N.E.2d at 153
(Clark, C.J., dissenting). The process of ascertaining legislative intent is further complicated when the court attempts to infer the legislature's intentions from the subsequent
actions of a later legislature which may be composed of different members. Id. at 39-40,
518 N.E.2d at 153 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
139. 121 Ill. 2d 136, 520 N.E.2d 270 (1987).
140. Id. at 160-61, 520 N.E.2d at 281.
141. Id. at 140-41, 520 N.E.2d at 272. The court concluded that the offenses of rape,
deviate sexual assault, and aggravated kidnapping "were accompanied by exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior indicating wanton cruelty." Id. at 141, 520 N.E.2d at 272.
Consequently, the court sentenced Holland to extended terms of 60 years of imprisonment for rape and deviate sexual assault and an extended term of 30 years of imprisonment for aggravated kidnaping. Id. The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently.
Id.
With regard to the armed robbery conviction, the court found that the defendant's
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reversed and remanded the case' 42 and the State was granted leave
to appeal.143 Holland challenged his conviction for armed robbery,
in addition to numerous procedural issues.'
He contended that
the State failed to prove that he took property from the complainant by force or threat of force, which is an essential element of the
case. 145
The court disagreed with the defendant's assertion and found
ample support for the defendant's armed robbery conviction."4 6
After reviewing the record, the court determined that the victim
had relinquished her school identification card and money in order
to avoid the defendant's further violence. 47 Under these circumstances, the court found that the State adequately proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant took the victim's property by
force or threat of force. 14 8 The court thus affirmed the appellate
court and upheld the defendant's armed robbery conviction. '
objectives during the crime changed from sexual gratification to armed robbery and that
the armed robbery occurred after the sexual assault was completed. Id. The court found
that the defendant had been previously convicted of armed robbery four times. Id. Based
on these findings, the court imposed a sentence of 25 years of imprisonment for the armed
robbery to be served consecutively to the other extended-term sentences. Id. at 141, 520
N.E.2d at 272.
142. People v. Holland, 147 Ill. App. 3d 323, 346, 497 N.E.2d 1230, 1246 (1st Dist.
1986).
143. Holland, 121 Ill. 2d at 142, 520 N.E.2d at 272.
144. Id. at 160, 520 N.E.2d at 281. For an in-depth discussion of these procedural
issues, see Carey & Feeley, Criminal Procedure,20 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 391, 400 (1989).
145. Holland, 121 I11.2d at 160, 520 N.E.2d at 281. The Illinois robbery statute
provides in pertinent part that "a person commits robbery when he takes property from
the person or presence of another by the use offorce or by threateningthe imminent use of
force." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 18-1(a)(1987)(emphasis added). A robbery committed "while [the perpetrator] carries on or about his or her person, or is otherwise
armed with a dangerous weapon" constitutes armed robbery. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 18-2(a) (1987).
146. Holland, 121 Ill. 2d. at 160-61, 520 N.E.2d at 281.
147. Id. at 160, 520 N.E.2d at 281. The complainant testified that after the assault,
the defendant, armed with a hunting knife, ordered the victim to close her eyes. Id. According to the victim, the defendant stated: "[I]t'll be easier that way. I'm going to knock
you out." Id. at 150, 520 N.E.2d at 276. The victim then offered him "anything he
wanted." Id. Holland took $60 and her school identification card. Id.
148. Id. at 160-61, 520 N.E.2d at 281.
149. Id. at 161, 520 N.E.2d at 281. The court vacated the defendant's extended-term
sentence for aggravated kidnaping and remanded the cause to the circuit court for resentencing on the aggravated kidnaping conviction. Id. at 163-64, 520 N.E.2d at 282. The
court found that the defendant's sentence conflicted with the extended-term sentencing
provision, which allows for extended-term sentences only when the offense is one of "the
class of the most serious of which the offender was convicted." Id. at 161, 520 N.E.2d at
281 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-2(a)(1987)). The defendant's aggravated
kidnaping conviction was a class 1 felony and the deviate sexual assault and rape were
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D. Constitutional Challenges to Statutes
1. Knowing Possession of Child Pornography
In People v. Geever,150 the Illinois Supreme Court, in a consolidated appeal, addressed the constitutionality of an Illinois statute
prohibiting the possession of child pornography.'-' The indictments charged John and Charlene Geever with twelve counts of
possession of child pornography and Peter Sotas with three counts
of possession of child pornography.' 52 The defendants moved to
dismiss, alleging that section 11-20.1(a)(2) violated the first and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution' 53 as well
class X felonies. Id. The court concluded that only the rape and deviate sexual assault
convictions could sustain extended-term sentences. Id.
In dissent, Justice Simon criticized the majority's analysis of the admissibility of the
defendant's confession and the exclusion of blacks from the jury. Id. at 172-78, 520
N.E.2d at 286-93 (Simon, J., dissenting).
150. 122 Ill. 2d 313, 522 N.E.2d 1200 (1988).
151. Id. at 315, 522 N.E.2d at 1201. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
11-20.1(a)(2)(1987). The statute provides in pertinent part that a person commits the
offense of child pornography when:
[W]ith the knowledge of the nature or content thereof, [he] reproduces, disseminates, offers to disseminate, exhibits or possesses any film, videotape, photograph
or other similar visual reproduction of any child whom the person knows or
reasonably should know to be under the age of 18 engaged in any activity described in subparagraphs (i) through (vii) of paragraphs (1) of this subsection.
Id. (emphasis added). The prohibited portrayals are those in which the child is:
(i) actually or by simulation engaged in any act of sexual intercourse with any
person or animal; or
(ii) actually or by simulation engaged in any act of sexual contact involving
the sex organs of the child and the mouth, anus, or sex organs of another person
or animal; or which involves the mouth, anus or sex organs of the child and the
sex organs of another person or animal; or
(iii) actually or by simulation engaged in any act of masturbation; or
(iv) actually or by simulation portrayed as being the object of, or otherwise
engaged in, any act of lewd fondling, touching, or caressing involving another
person or animal; or
(v) actually or by simulation engaged in any act of excretion or urination
within a sexual context; or
(vi) actually or by simulation portrayed or depicted as bound, fettered, or subject to sadistic, masochistic, or sadomasochistic abuse in any sexual context; or
(vii) depicted or portrayed in any pose, posture or setting involving a lewd
exhibition of the genitals of the child or other person ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 11-20.1 (a)(l)(i) - (vii) (1987).
2d at 315, 520 N.E.2d at 1201.
152. Geever, 122 I11.
153. The first amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or to the right of
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for redress of grievances."
U.S. CON ST. amend. I (emphasis added). The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States provides in pertinent part: "No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
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56
as article 1, sections 454 and 6155 of the Illinois Constitution.
The circuit courts of Cook and DuPage counties granted the defendants' motions to dismiss and held that the specific provision at
157 The State directly appealed both
issue is unconstitutional.
58
dismissals.
In challenging the statute, the defendants focused primarily on
the first amendment and argued that in proscribing the knowing
possession of child pornography in the home, the statute is unconstitutional.' 59 The defendants relied specifically upon the United
States Supreme Court's holding that an individual's first amendment rights within his own home far outweigh any government
interest in regulating obscenity." 6° The Geever court's analysis,
however, relied primarily upon precedent that recognized that the
dissemination of child pornography bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children that the state's interest in 6prohibition far outweighs any individual first amendment right.' '

any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, section 1.
154. Section 4 of the Illinois Constitution provides in pertinent part: "All persons
may speak, write and publish freely, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 4.
155. Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution provides in pertinent part: "The people
shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions
against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means ...." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6.
156. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d at 315, 520 N.E.2d at 1201.
157. Id. The courts' findings were based upon the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Geever, 122 Ill. 2d at 315, 522 N.E.2d
at 1201. Specifically, the courts found that under the first and fourteenth amendments to
the Constitution, the possession of child pornography within the home is permitted. Id.
158. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d at 315, 522 N.E.2d at 1201.
159. Id. at 316-17, 522 N.E.2d at 1201.
160. Id. The defendants relied on Stanley v. Georgia for this proposition. Id. In
Stanley, the United States Supreme Court struck down the constitutionality of a Georgia
statute that prohibited the possession of obscene material within the home. Stanley, 394
U.S. at 568. Although the Stanley Court recognized that obscene material was not protected constitutionally, the Court rejected the State's argument that it had the right "to
protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity." Id. at 560, 565-66. The Stanley Court rejected the State's position as "wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the
First Amendment" because it attempted to control the moral content of a person's
thoughts. Id. at 565-66.
161. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d at 319-27, 522 N.E.2d at 1203-07 (citing New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747 (1982)). In Ferber, the defendant, an adult bookstore owner, sold two films
to an undercover police officer that depicted two boys masturbating. Ferber,458 U.S. at
751-52. The State indicted the defendant on two counts of violating a New York statute
that prohibited one from promoting a performance of sexual conduct by a child under 16
years of age. Id. at 752. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction, finding that the statute violated the first amendment. Id. The United States
Supreme Court, in upholding the statute, concluded that a state has greater authority to
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In construing the Illinois statute, the court first ascertained the
legislature's intent.' 62 The court concluded that the legislature enacted this statute in order to prevent and control the sexual abuse
and exploitation of children, which it recognized as a national
problem that seriously affects Illinois. 163 The legislature intended
to prevent not only the production of child pornography, but the
dissemination and possession of child pornography as well.' 6
Although the court acknowledged special constitutional safeguards to freedom of thought and mind in the privacy of one's
home, 65 it emphasized that such protection is subject to limitation.166 The court found that the individual's right to freedom of
conduct at home must yield to society's compelling interest to
protect children from the harm of emotional and sexual
7
degradation. 16
The court determined that because the statute requires scienter
as to the content and nature of the depictions and specifically described the depictions and conduct subject to the statute,' 68 the
1 69
statute meets the minimum guidelines for constitutionality.
Consequently, the court held that the statute does not violate
70
either the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution.
prohibit works portraying sexual acts by children than obscene materials portraying
adults engaged in sexual activity and that the dissemination of child pornography clearly
does not have first amendment protection. Id. at 756-65. The court also noted that advertising and selling child pornography provided the financial incentive to produce it.
Id. at 759-65.
162. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d at 324, 522 N.E.2d at 1205. For the text of the Illinois statute, see supra note 15 1.
163. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d at 324, 522 N.E.2d at 1205.
164. Id. The court recognized that the incentive for producing and disseminating
child pornography is the ability to sell the product. Id. at 326, 522 N.E.2d at 1206. By
restricting possession of child pornography, the legislature intended to dry up the market.
Id.
165. Id. at 325, 522 N.E.2d at 1205.
166. Id. at 325, 522 N.E.2d at 1205-06 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986)(due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not confer a right of privacy
to homosexuals to commit sodomy in their homes)).
167. Id. at 327, 522 N.E.2d at 1206-07.
168. Id. at 327, 522 N.E.2d at 1207. See supra note 151 for the pertinent text of the
statute.
169. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d at 327, 522 N.E.2d at 1207.
170. Id. The court cited cases in which other state courts upheld the constitutionality of similar statutes proscribing the possession of child pornography. Id. at 327-28, 522
N.E.2d at 1207 (citing Felton v. State, 526 So. 2d 635 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986), aff'd, 526
So. 2d 638 (Ala. 1988); State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d 697, cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 936 (1987)).
The court also noted other states that criminalized the knowing possession of child
pornography. Id. at 329, 522 N.E.2d at 1207 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.322
(A)(5) (Baldwin 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1021.2 (West Supp. 1989); NEV.
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Finally, the defendants argued that they were deprived of due
process because the Illinois statute does not fairly give notice that
the possession of child pornography in the home is illegal.171 The
court, however, determined that the language of section 1120. l(a)(2) provides adequate notice of the proscribed conduct and
thus does not violate the defendant's right to due process. 172 The
court consequently reversed
the judgments and remanded the cases
1 73
to the circuit courts.

Although Justice Clark agreed that this case involved "admittedly repugnant material," ' 74 he would have held the statute violative of the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution and
article I, sections 4 and 6 of the Illinois Constitution. 75 Justice
Clark traced the history and importance of the free speech provisions, 176 and conceded that child pornography is "worthless
rubbish" that is not entitled to the protection of the first amendment. 177 He disagreed, however, with the majority's application of
Ferber.178 He argued that Ferber did not extend to the question of
179
private possession and that Stanley, therefore, applied.
Justice Clark also criticized the majority's failure to address the
state constitutional issues.180 Whereas the federal guarantee of privacy is found only in the "penumbras" of provisions of the Bill of
REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.730 (Michie 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-23.1
(1988); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5a-3(l)(a) (Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.070(l)(1988)).
171. Id. at 329, 522 N.E.2d at 1207-08. The defendants argued that in possessing the
pornography, they relied on Stanley's holding that the state could not proscribe the mere
possession of obscene materials in the home under the first and fourteenth amendments.
Id. at 329, 522 N.E.2d at 1208.
172. Id. at 330, 522 N.E.2d at 1208.
173. Id.
174. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 331, 522 N.E.2d at 1208 (Clark, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 331-34, 522 N.E.2d at 1208-10 (Clark, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 334, 522 N.E.2d at 1210 (Clark, J., dissenting).
178. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting). Although Ferber would allow governmental regulation of the production and distribution of child pornography or other unprotected materials, Ferber did not address the separate and unrelated issue of an individual's private
possession of child pornography in his home. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
179. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting). Under the burden imposed by Stanley, the State must
demonstrate a compelling governmental interest that cannot be served by more narrowly
tailored means. Id. at 330-31, 522 N.E.2d at 1208. Although the State's interest in
preventing child abuse was indisputable here, Justice Clark concluded that the government failed to show its goal could not be achieved by less restrictive methods. Id. He
would have, therefore, invalidated the statute on first amendment grounds. Id. at 337,
522 N.E.2d at 1211 (Clark, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).

19891

Criminal Law

Rights,'' the Illinois Constitution explicitly protects citizens
against invasions of their privacy12 and must be construed
broadly.'8 3 Justice Clark stated that because a state court's interpretation of the Illinois Constitution need not parallel a federal
court's interpretation of the United States Constitution, the Illinois
Supreme Court is free to recognize the greater and more certain
protection to privacy afforded by the state constitution. 8 4 Because
the state guarantee of privacy also protects private possession of
reading material, Justice Clark would invalidate the statute on
state constitutional grounds as well. 8 5
2.

Aggravated Battery on a State or County
Public Aid Worker

In People v. Watson,' 8 6 the court considered the constitutionality
of a provision of the aggravated battery statute.8 7 The challenged
provision elevates battery to aggravated battery when the defendant committed battery against a state or county public aid
worker.'
The defendant, Brenda Watson, who struck a Jackson
181. Id. at 339-40, 522 N.E.2d at 1212 (Clark, J., dissenting). Many scholars have
questioned the textual and historical legitimacy of any federal constitutional right of privacy. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973).
182. Geever, 122 I11.2d at 337, 522 N.E.2d at 1211 (Clark, J., dissenting). See supra
note 155 for the text of this constitutional provision.
183. Id. at 338, 522 N.E.2d at 1211-12 (Clark, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 339, 522 N.E.2d at 1212 (Clark, J., dissenting). Accord PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)(recognizing a state's sovereign right to
adopt, in its own constitution, free speech provisions that are more expansive than those
conferred by the United States Constitution).
185. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d at 342, 522 N.E.2d at 1214 (Clark, J., dissenting).
186. 118 Ill. 2d 62, 514 N.E.2d 167 (1987).
187. Id. at 66-69, 514 N.E.2d at 169-71. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 124(b)(5)(1987).
188. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-4(b)(5) (1987). The challenged statute provides, in pertinent part:
(b) A person who, in committing a battery, commits an aggravated battery if
he either:
(5) knows the individual harmed to be a caseworker, investigator, or other
person employed by the State Department of Public Aid or a County Department of Public Aid and such caseworker, investigator, or other person is upon
the grounds of a Public Aid office or grounds adjacent thereto, or is in any part
of a building used for Public Aid purposes, or upon the grounds of a home of a
public aid applicant, recipient, or any other person being interviewed or investigated in the employee's discharge of his duties, or on grounds adjacent thereto,
or is in any part of a building in which the applicant, recipient, or other such
person resides or is located;
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County caseworker while at the public aid office,1"9 contended that
section 12-4(b)(5) of the statute violates equal protection 90 because
it imposes stricter penalties when a defendant attacked state or
county workers than when a defendant attacked local workers.' 91
The circuit court found no reasonable basis for distinguishing
between state, county, and local workers who performed the same
duties and, therefore, held section
12-4-(b)(5) unconstitutional. 192
Upon the State's appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and held
the statute valid under an equal protection analysis. 93 The court
Id.
189. Watson, 118 Ill. 2d at 64, 514 N.E.2d at 168. The State initially charged Watson
with aggravated battery under section 12-4(b)(5) because she knew that the person she
struck was an employee of the Department of Public Aid. Id. The State later amended
the information to include a second count for aggravation under section 12-4(b)(8) because the battery occurred on public property. Id. The pertinent portion of the statute
provides:
(b) A person who, in committing a battery, commits an aggravated battery if
he either:
(8) Is, or the person battered is, on or about a public way, public property or
public place of accommodation or amusement.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-4(b)(8)(1987).
190. Watson, 118 Ill. 2d at 66, 514 N.E.2d at 169. The equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "[Nior shall any State ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. The equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall... be denied the equal protection of the laws." ILL. CONsT. art.
I, § 2.
191. Watson, 118 Ill. 2d at 65, 514 N.E.2d at 169.
192. Id. at 65, 67, 514 N.E.2d at 169, 170.
193. Id. at 69, 514 N.E.2d at 171. Initially, the court considered the State's argument
that Watson lacked standing to challenge the validity of the statute. Id. at 65-66, 514
N.E.2d at 169. The State focused on three points. Id. First, it argued that the statute
does not adversely affect the defendant's rights because the defendant could be charged
under either section of the statute, section 12-4(b)(5) or 12-4(b)(8). Id. at 65, 514 N.E.2d
at 169. The language charging the defendant under 12-4(b)(5) is "merely duplicative" of
that in 12-4(b)(8). Id. Therefore, the State argued that section 12-4(b)(5) itself does not
adversely affect Watson's rights. Id.
Second, the State argued that the defendant could not challenge the validity of section
12-4(b)(5) because the State charged her with a battery committed in a public place,
which falls within the purview of section 12-4(b)(8). Id. The State reasoned that Watson's challenge to section 12-4(b)(5) could not stand because it was based on an argument
that, hypothetically, it could be applied unconstitutionally to another party. Id. Finally,
the State argued that the defendant lacked standing because she had not been found
guilty or sentenced under the statute. Id. at 65-66, 514 N.E.2d at 169.
The court readily rejected the State's arguments, relying on People v. Ziltz, 98 Ill. 2d
38, 455 N.E.2d 70 (1983). Watson, 118 Ill. 2d at 66, 514 N.E.2d at 169. In Ziltz, the
court stated that "a defendant has standing to challenge the validity of a statute if he or
she has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of
the enforcement of the statute." Ziltz, 98 Ill. 2d at 41, 455 N.E.2d at 71. The Watson
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rejected the defendant's assertion that the statute creates an unreasonable classification violative of equal protection. 194 Instead, the
court recognized that a state may, in the absence of a fundamental
right, differentiate between similarly situated persons as long as it
shows a rational basis for doing so.195

In its analysis, the court reviewed portions of the Public Aid
Code' 96 and compared the duties performed by state and county
employees with those of local governmental units. 197 The court
noted significant differences in their respective duties. 98 Although
state and county employees are charged with planning, administering, and investigating a variety of programs, the Code empowers
local units with much less responsibility and authority.1 99
Additionally, the Watson court recognized that courts have upheld statutes intended to afford greater protection to categories of
people who are subjected to greater risks in performing special duties. 200 The court recognized that the more extensive authority and
court reasoned that because the defendant was charged with violating section 12-4(b)(5),
it was possible that he would be convicted and sustain harm. Watson, 118 Ill. 2d at 66,
514 N.E.2d at 169. Watson thus possessed standing to challenge the statute. Id.
194. Watson, 118 I11.2d at 67, 514 N.E.2d at 170.
195. Id. (citing People v. Tosch, 114 I11.2d 474, 481, 501 N.E.2d 1253, 1256 (1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3235 (1987)). In Tosch, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld, on
equal protection grounds, a provision of the highway solicitation statute that exempted
from the purview of the statute charitable solicitations by agencies that met specific conditions and that received express permission by municipal ordinance. Tosch, 114 Ill. 2d
at 480-83, 501 N.E.2d at 1255-57. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 111006(c)(1987).
The Tosch court stated that a reasonable classification resting on some difference related to the objective of the legislation that treats similarly situated persons alike will be
upheld. Tosch, 114 Ill. 2d at 481, 501 N.E.2d at 1256. For a detailed discussion of Tosch,
see MacCarthy & Jarzyna, CriminalLaw, 19 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 373, 404-07 (1988).
196. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 1-1 to 13-5 (1987).
197. Watson, 118 Ill. 2d at 67-68, 514 N.E.2d at 170.
198. Id. at 68, 514 N.E.2d at 170.
199. Id. Articles II, IV, V, VII, and XII of the Public Aid Code delineate the responsibilities of state and county public aid workers. The Code authorizes state and county
workers to administer programs to accomplish the following: provide aid to the aged,
blind, and disabled, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 3-1 to 3-15 (1987); provide aid to
families with dependent children, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 4-1 to 4-12 (1983); provide medical assistance, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 5-1 to 5-14 (1987); provide aid to
the medically indigent, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 7-1 to 7-6 (1987).
By contrast, articles VI and IX of the Public Aid Code describe the duties and responsibilities of local workers. Article VI empowers local government units to administer the
programs as provided in article VI. Article IX grants local units the authority to provide
the social services and rehabilitative services authorized in article IX. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 23, para. 9-1 (1987).
200. Watson, 118 Ill. 2d at 67, 514 N.E.2d at 170 (citing People v. Hanson, 53 I11. 2d
79, 289 N.E.2d 611 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 937 (1973) (enhancement to aggravated
battery valid when the offender knew the person harmed was either a peace officer or
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responsibility given state and county public aid workers placed
them in situations of greater risk.2° '
The court reasoned that the legislature imposed an enhanced
punishment for an offense committed against a state or county
worker in order to protect these employees.2 °2 The court concluded that the classification is reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective 20 3 and refused to consider whether the legislature's chosen means were the best available. 2° Consequently,
the court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded
the cause for proceedings consistent with its opinion.2 °5
Summary Suspension of Driving Privileges/Issuance of
Judicial Permits
2
°6
In People v. Esposito, the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality of several provisions of the summary driving suspension law. 207 Pursuant to section 11-501.1 of the Vehicle
Code,208 the state summarily suspended the driving privileges of
3.

correctional institution employee); In re V.P., 139 Ill. App. 3d 786, 487 N.E.2d 638 (2d
Dist. 1985)(enhancement to aggravated battery valid when the offender knew that the
victim was a group worker at a county youth detention home); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 12-4(b)(6)(1987)).
201. Id. at 68, 514 N.E.2d at 170.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 68-69, 514 N.E.2d at 170-71. The court stated that such consideration
was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry. Id. (citing People v. Tosch, 114 Ill. 2d 474,
482, 501 N.E.2d 1253, 1257 (1986) (quoting Garcia v. Tully, 72 Ill. 2d 1, 10, 377 N.E.2d
10, 14 (1978))).
205. Id. at 69, 514 N.E.2d at 171.
206. 121 Ill. 2d 491, 521 N.E.2d 873 (1988). The court considered this challenge on
direct appeal by the Secretary of State. Id. at 496-97, 521 N.E.2d at 875.
207. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, paras. 11-501.1, 6-206.1 (1987). See infra notes 208
and 210, respectively, for the provisions of these sections of the Vehicle Code.
208. Section 11-501.1 of the Vehicle Code provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
upon the public highways of this State shall be deemed to have given consent,
subject to the provisions of Section 11-501.2, to a chemical test or tests of blood,
breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol, other drug, or combination thereof content of such person's blood if arrested, as evidenced by the
issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket, for any offense as defined in section 11-501
or a similar provision of a local ordinance ....
(c) A person requested to submit to a test as provided above shall be warned
by the law enforcement officer requesting the test that a refusal to submit to the
test will result in the statutory summary suspension of such person's privilege to
operate a motor vehicle as provided in section 6-208.1 of this Code. The person
shall also be warned by the law enforcement officer that if the person submits to
the test or tests provided for in section (a) of this Section and the alcohol concentration in such person's blood or breath is 0.10 or greater, a statutory sum-
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the defendant, Cheryl Esposito, after she consented to a
breathalyzer test that registered her blood alcohol concentration as
0. 16.20 Esposito subsequently petitioned for a judicial driving permit pursuant to section 6-206.1 of the Vehicle Code.21° She also
petitioned for a hearing to rescind her summary suspension. 21'

Esposito alleged on appeal that sections 11-501.1 and 6-206.1
violates the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution 212 and that

section 6-206.1 violates the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. 213 The circuit court agreed and subsequently
held both sections invalid.21 4
mary suspension of such person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle, as
provided in Sections 6-208.1 and 11-501.1 of this Code will be imposed.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501.1(a), 11-501.1(c)(1987).
209. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 495-96, 521 N.E.2d at 875. The Illinois Appellate Court
previously upheld the constitutionality of the provision authorizing summary suspension
of drivers who either refused to submit to a breathalyzer test or who failed the test. See
People v. Flores, 155 Ill. App. 3d 964, 508 N.E.2d 1132 (2d Dist. 1987).
210. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 496, 521 N.E.2d at 875. Section 6-206.1 of the Vehicle
Code authorizes a person whose license has been suspended for the first time pursuant to
section 11-501.1 to request the court to grant a judicial driving permit in order to relieve
undue hardship. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 6-206.1 (1987). The statute also
provides guidelines for the court to consider prior to issuing a judicial driving permit and
prohibits issuance of a permit in certain instances. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 6206.1(a)(3) (1987). For further discussion of this statute, see MacCarthy & Jarzyna,
Criminal Law, 19 Loy. U. CI. L.J. 373, 423-35 (1988).
211. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 496, 514 N.E.2d at 875. Esposito petitioned for a hearing
under section 2-118. l(b) of the Motor Vehicle Code which provides that:
(b) Upon the notice of statutory summary suspension served under Section
11-501.1, the person may make a written request for a judicial hearing in the
circuit court of venue. The request to the circuit court shall state the grounds
upon which the person seeks to have the statutory summary suspension rescinded. Within 30 days after receipts of the written request[,] ... the hearing
shall be conducted by the circuit court having jurisdiction. This judicial hearing, request or process shall not stay or delay the statutory summary suspension. Such hearings shall proceed in the court in the same manner as in other
civil proceedings....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 2-118.1(b)(1985).
212. The United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend
XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
The Illinois Constitution provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of
the laws." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added).
213. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 497, 514 N.E.2d at 875. The separation of powers clause
in the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides: "The legislative, executive and judicial
branches are separate. No branch shall exercise property belonging to another." ILL.
CONST. art. II, § 1.
214. Esposito, 121 I11.2d at 496, 521 N.E.2d at 875. The Illinois Supreme Court
recently upheld against a separation of powers challenge the provision that directed the
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In reversing the lower court, the Illinois Supreme Court first determined that the challenged statutes did not affect a fundamental
right or discriminate unreasonably against a suspect class.215 The
court thus applied a rational basis test in judging the statute.21 6
The court rejected the defendant's contention that by penalizing
those who drive drunk on public highways differently than those
who drive on private property, the statute's classification is irrational. 21 7 Instead, the court deferred to legislative judgment 218 and
reasoned that the legislature may have reasonably believed that intoxicated drivers pose a greater threat on highways while driving at
high speeds than on private roads where the speed limits tend to be
lower.219
The court further observed that the defendant misconstrued section 11-501.1 when she argued that it violates equal protection by
penalizing only drivers with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10
or more, while not penalizing other categories of drivers who were
less impaired or impaired by other drugs.2 20 The court emphasized
circuit court to forward reinstatement fees to the Secretary of State. People v. O'Donnell,
116 Ill. 2d 517, 508 N.E.2d 1066 (1987). For a detailed discussion of the O'Donnell
court's analysis, see MacCarthy & Jarzyna, CriminalLaw, 19 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 373, 40204 (1988).
215. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 500, 521 N.E.2d at 877.
216. Id. When applying a rational basis test, the reviewing court will uphold the
statute in question if it can find a rational relationship between the classification created
and a legitimate state purpose. Id. (citing People v. Tosch, 114 Ill. 2d 474, 501 N.E.2d
1253 (1986)). The court described the two-stage equal protection analysis. First, the
court determines the level of scrutiny applicable to the challenged classification. A
higher level of scrutiny is necessitated when a fundamental right or suspect class is involved. When neither category is involved, the court may use a lower level of scrutiny.
In the second step of the analysis, the court scrutinizes the goal of the state. If the statute
affects a fundamental right or a suspect class, then the court will sustain the statute only
when it serves a compelling state interest. If no fundamental right or suspect class is
involved, however, then the rational basis test is appropriate. Id.
217. Id. Esposito identified a purported inconsistency between section 11-501, which
penalizes impaired drivers who drive anywhere in the state, and section 11-501.1, which
applies the summary suspension procedure and the implied consent concept only to those
who drive on public highways. Id. The defendant claimed that because the hazards of
drunken driving are similar whether an intoxicated person drives on private property or
on a public highway, the legislature's distinction and classification is irrational and arbitrary. Id.
218. Id. at 501, 521 N.E.2d at 877.
219. Id. Although the court recognized the argument that the legislature should
have adopted the summary suspension to apply to all drunken drivers, the court stated
that it could uphold the statute as long as it is not arbitrary and will accomplish the
legislature's purposes. Id. at 501-02, 521 N.E.2d at 878 (citing Schiller Park Colonial
Inn, Inc. v. Berz, 63 Ill. 2d 499, 349 N.E.2d 61 (1976)).
220. Id. at 502, 521 N.E.2d at 878. The defendant claimed that such a distinction
was irrational and appeared to assert that summary suspension should be imposed on all
impaired drivers regardless of the cause or degree of their impairment. Id.
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that the statute imposes summary suspension on all drivers who
refuse to submit to the test, regardless of whether they were impaired by alcohol or other drugs. Secondarily, the statute imposes
summary suspension on those who submitted and whose test results demonstrated a blood alcohol level of 0.10 or more. 22 ' Additionally, the court disagreed with the defendant's contention that a
person with a blood alcohol count of 0.10 or more and a person
under the influence of other drugs are so similarly situated that
they require identical treatment under the equal protection
clause. 22 2 The court found that the legislature enacted the summary suspension statute in response to widespread concern for the
dangers posed by drunken drivers.223 It stated that the legislature
may have rationally concluded that the need to remove drunk drivers from the highways was more urgent than the removal of other
categories of impaired drivers. 224 The court, therefore, permitted
the legislature to take reform "one step at a time."22'

Furthermore, the legislature's conclusive determination that a
blood alcohol level of at least 0.10 impairs a person's ability to
drive, eliminates the need for additional proof of impairment.226
The legislature did not make a similar determination for impairment by drugs other than alcohol.227 Therefore, in these situations
the state must conduct a hearing to demonstrate that the intoxicating substance actually impaired the driver.22 Those who use drugs
or a combination of alcohol and drugs do not escape punishment if
221. Id.
222. Id. at 502-03, 521 N.E.2d at 878.
223. Id. at 503, 521 N.E.2d at 878.
224. Id. The court stated that the legislation "need not ...cover every evil that
might conceivably have been attacked." Id. (citing Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp.,
III Ill. 2d 350, 372-73, 489 N.E.2d 1374, 1384 (1986)(quoting McDonald v. Board of
Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969))).
225. Id. (quoting Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp., Ill11ll. 2d 350, 372-73, 489
N.E.2d 1374, 1384 (1986)(quoting McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S.
802, 809 (1969))).
226. Id. at 503-04, 514 N.E.2d at 878. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld this provision in People v. Ziltz, 98 Ill. 2d 38, 455 N.E.2d 70 (1983), in which the court stated:
The obvious legislative intent in enabling section 11-501(a)(l) was to impose
strict liability on drivers found to be impaired by an alcohol concentrate of
0.10% or above. Defendant argues, and the state admits, that holding the driving of a motor vehicle with more than 0.10% concentrate is an offense by itself
does away with all necessity for the state to show impairment. The legislature
has made the determination that driving with an alcohol concentration of 0. 10
or above does constitute impairment.
Id. at 42-43, 455 N.E.2d at 72.
227. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 503, 521 N.E.2d at 878.
228. Id. at 503-04, 521 N.E.2d at 878-79.
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their abilities have been found to be impaired. 229 The court thus

found that the legislature acted rationally when it imposed summary suspension on drivers who tested 0.10 and not on other categories of impaired persons. 230 The court concluded that section 11-

501.1 does not violate equal protection.231
The Esposito court next considered the defendant's due process
attack on the summary suspension procedures.232 Specifically, the
defendant argued that the failure to allow an evidentiary hearing
prior to suspension violates her due process rights. 23 3 The court
responded, however, that due process does not necessarily require
an evidentiary hearing in every instance in which the state seeks to
suspend driving privileges.23 4
The court applied a balancing test and specifically considered
three factors: the nature and weight of the private interest affected
by the statute; the likelihood of erroneous deprivation of the private interest involved as a result of the procedures used; and the
government's interest in enacting the procedures and the burdens
resulting from alternative procedures.235
In considering the first factor, the court identified the private
interest at stake as the continued possession of a driver's license
pending the outcome of a hearing.236 The court determined that
the duration of the suspension, 2 7 the availability of review, 2 38 and
229. Id. at 504, 521 N.E.2d at 879.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. The defendant argued and the State conceded that once issued, a license to
drive is a protected property interest that requires due process guarantees prior to suspension or revocation. Id.
234. Id. (citing Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977)). In Dixon, the United States
Supreme Court upheld an Illinois statute authorizing the state to revoke without a hearing the license of a motorist whose license had been repeatedly suspended for certain
traffic offenses. Dixon, 431 U.S. at 112-16.
235. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 505, 514 N.E.2d at 879. This three-factor balancing test
was first adopted in Matthew v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). After identifying and
reviewing the three factors, the Eldridge court held that due process did not require a
hearing before terminating benefits under the Social Security Act.
The Eldridge test also was used in Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979). In Mackey,
the United States Supreme Court upheld a Massachusetts statute authorizing the state to
suspend the license of one who refused to submit to a breath test upon arrest for driving
under the influence. Id. at 19.
236. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 506, 521 N.E.2d at 879. The United States Supreme
Court's prior holding in Mackey suggested that the actual weight given to this interest
depended on: 1) the duration of the suspension; 2) the availability of prompt review after
the suspension; and 3) the availability of hardship relief. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 11-19.
237. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 506, 514 N.E.2d at 880. The Illinois statute provides for
a six-month suspension when one refused to submit to the test, and a three-month sus-
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the availability of hardship relief under the statute 239 do not differ
significantly from those in other cases in which summary provisions were upheld. 2 1 In fact, the Illinois statute provides additional hardship relief in the form of a judicial driving permit.24 1
Under these circumstances, the court concluded that neither the
nature nor the weight of the private interest requires a prior evidentiary hearing.242
In considering the second factor, the court examined the likelihood that the summary suspension would lead to erroneous deprivation of driving privileges.24 3 The defendant argued that a
suspension based on a chemical test is inherently more fallible than
a suspension based on the driver's refusal to take the test and,
therefore, necessitates an evidentiary hearing prior to suspension. 2 " In rejecting this argument, the court relied primarily on
pension when a driver submitted and the test results indicated a 0.10 or higher blood
alcohol concentration. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, paras. 11-501.1, 6-2087.1 (1987).
The court compared the length of suspension in the Illinois statute to those in other
suspension statutes that courts have upheld. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1
(1979)(statute provided a 90-day suspension); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977)(statute
provided a one-year suspension); People ex rel. Eppingina v. Edgar, 112 Ill. 2d 101, 492
N.E.2d 187 (1986)(statute provided revocation for an indefinite period of time).
238. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 506-07, 514 N.E.2d at 880. The court compared the
Illinois system for post-suspension review with those provisions approved in previous
decisions. Section 2-118.1 of the Vehicle Code requires a judicial hearing within 30 days
after receipt of a written request by the driver. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 2118.1 (1987). Further, the suspension is not effective until 46 days after the state notifies
the driver of the suspension. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501.1(g)(1987). These
provisions can result in either a pre- or post-suspension review, depending on the timeliness of the driver's request. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 507, 521 N.E.2d at 880.
The court found that the provision for review in the Illinois statute falls between those
approved in Love and Montrym. See supra notes 234 and 235 for a brief description of
the statutes at issue and the court's holdings in these cases. In Love, the approved statute
required a hearing within 20 days after the driver's written request for review. The statute in Montrym provided for review immediately upon suspension, initiated only by the
driver's oral request for review. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 506-07, 521 N.E.2d at 880.
239. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 507, 521 N.E.2d at 880. The court noted that the statute's provisions for hardship relief were previously approved by the United States
Supreme Court in Montrym. See supra note 196 for a description of the statute at issue in
Montrym. The Illinois statute allows a first time offender to petition the court for a judicial driving permit to use for employment or alcohol treatment purposes. See ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 6-206.1 (1987). Alternatively, the offender may petition the Secretary of State for a permit to "relieve undue hardship." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2,
para. 6-205 (c)(1987).
240. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 507, 521 N.E.2d at 880.
241. Id.

242. Id.
243. -Id.
244. Id. at 508-09, 521 N.E.2d at 881. Even assuming arguendo that the risk of error
regarding chemical testing is enhanced, the court remained unpersuaded that the risk is
so substantial as to require an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 509, 521 N.E.2d at 881. The
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evidence that a police officer observed the defendant's drunken behavior, which was subsequently substantiated by the chemical
test.245 Further, the court determined that the statute minimizes
the risk of erroneous deprivation by allowing for a challenge to the
validity of the test results. 246
In considering the third factor, the court addressed the public
interest in the summary suspension procedure and the burdens resulting from alternative procedures.24 7 The court recognized the
state's compelling interest in protecting the public from drunken
drivers on the highways.248 It acknowledged that summary suspension promotes the state's interest by promptly removing
drunken motorists from the roads and by deterring drunken drivers. 24 The court found merit in the statute's tendency to encourage drivers to cooperate in testing, thus preserving drivers' due
process rights, while providing the state with objective evidence of
drunkenness.250
Consequently, the court concluded that the summary suspension
procedure satisfies the due process requirements because it advances the state's interest in public safety, while exposing the
driver to an "insubstantial risk" of erroneous deprivation of
rights.251 In conclusion, the court held that the summary suspension procedure is consistent with the equal protection and due process clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions, while
declining to address the constitutionality of the judicial driving
court reiterated that due process does not mandate that all governmental decisions assure
perfect, error-free determinations. Id. (quoting Mackey, 443 U.S. at 13).
245. Id. The evidence in the record revealed that a police officer stopped Esposito
after he saw her car cross the center line of the road twice. When he spoke with the
defendant, he noticed that her breath smelled of alcohol and that her eyes were blood
shot. A breathalizer test revealed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.16. Id.
246. Id. at 509-10, 521 N.E.2d at 881. Specifically, the court suggested that the hearing provided for by section 2-118.1 of the Motor Vehicle Code gives the driver an opportunity to challenge the results of the test. The court cited People v. Hamilton, 118 Ill. 2d
153, 514 N.E.2d 965 (1987), in which the Illinois Supreme Court held that one whose
license has been revoked may challenge the testing procedure and the admission of allegedly invalid test results at a hearing pursuant to section 2-118.1. For the text of the
relevant portion of section 2-118.1, see supra note 211.
247. Esposito, 121 111. 2d at 510, 521 N.E.2d at 881.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 510, 521 N.E.2d at 881-82. The court also noted that automatic suspension promotes the public's interest in administrative efficiency in that it eliminates the
incentive to seek a presuspension hearing for the purpose of delaying suspension. Id. at
510, 521 N.E.2d at 882.
251. Id. at 511, 521 N.E.2d at 882.
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permit provision.'e252
court thus reversed and remanded the
cause to the circuit court. 2 53

4.

Criminal Sexual Assault/Aggravated Criminal
Sexual Assault

In People v. Haywood,254 the Illinois Supreme Court consolidated
the appeals of four defendants 255 in order to review the constitutionality of several provisions of the criminal sexual assault statute2 56 and the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute.25 7
Specifically, the defendants challenged
the phrases "force or threat
259
of force" 25 8 and "bodily harm.

Before trial, each defendant moved to dismiss the charges, alleging that the definitions under the criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault statutes violate the United States
Constitution's due process guarantees because they are vague and
overbroad. 2 ° Both the Marion County Circuit Court and the Fayette County Circuit Court declared that sections 12-13(a)(1) and
252. Id. at 516, 521 N.E.2d at 884. As a final matter, the court considered the defendant's separation of powers challenge to section 6-206.1 of the Vehicle Code, which
permits the issuance of judicial driving permits. Id. at 511-16, 521 N.E.2d at 882-84.
The court, however, declined to address the merits of this claim because it held that the
defendant lacked standing to question the statute's constitutional validity. Id. at 512-13,
521 N.E.2d at 882-83.
253. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 516, 521 N.E.2d at 884.
254. 118 Ill. 2d 263, 515 N.E.2d 45 (1987).
255. Defendant John Haywood was charged in Marion County with two counts of
aggravated criminal sexual assault. Id. at 266, 515 N.E.2d at 47. Defendants Rhodes,
Russell, and Garland were individually charged in Fayette County with one count of
aggravated criminal sexual assault and with criminal sexual assault as a lesser included
offense. The Fayette County court also charged the defendant Garland with a second
offense of criminal sexual assault based on a separate incident. Id.
256. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-13 (1987). The statute provides in pertinent
part: "(a) The accused commits criminal sexual assault if he or she: (1) commits an act
of sexual penetration by the use offorce or threat offorce .... " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 12-13(a)(l)(1987)(emphasis added).
257. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-14 (1987). The statute provides in pertinent
part:
(a) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if he or she commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances existed during the
commission of the offense:
(2)

the accused caused bodily harm to the victim ....

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-14(a)(2)(1987)(emphasis added).

258. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 268-69, 515 N.E.2d at 48.
259. Id. at 275-77, 515 N.E.2d at 51-52.
260. Id. at 267, 515 N.E.2d at 47. For the text of the United States Constitution's
due process clause, see supra note 212.
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12-14(a)(2) are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 26 ,

On appeal, the court considered the defendant's argument that
section 12-13(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it
fails to adequately describe the proscribed conduct constituting
criminal sexual assault and fails to provide a clear standard for
enforcement.262 Specifically, the defendants argued that the definition of "force or threat of force" in section 12-12(d) did not indicate the nature or quality of the force required to constitute an
offense under section 12-13.263 Further, they argued that the offense of criminal sexual assault is "in derogation of the common
law offense of rape,

'264

and that the statute must, therefore, be con-

strued strictly. They contended that "force" must be interpreted
literally and, therefore, must be construed in its broadest sense possible.2 65 Because of this literal and broad interpretation of the statute, the defendants concluded that the statute fails to proscribe
adequately the nature of the force necessary to constitute the
offense.266
The court stated that a challenged statute will be unconstitutionally vague on its face only when the statute specifies no standard of
conduct.267 The court stated that it could consider this particular

statute vague only if "force" is interpreted literally to mean every
possible use of force. 268 The court relied on legislative intent and

common sense in concluding that the statute adequately defines the
conduct proscribed.269
In examining the legislative history of the statutes in question,
the court concluded that the legislature intended to replace the repealed offenses of rape and deviate sexual assault, which required
261. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 267, 515 N.E.2d at 47. The Circuit Court of Marion
County held the entire Criminal Sexual Assault Act unconstitutional. Upon reconsideration, the court modified its judgment and limited its ruling to sections 12-13 (a)(1) and
12-14(a)(2). Id.
262. Id. at 268-69, 515 N.E.2d at 48.
263. Id. at 269, 515 N.E.2d at 48.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 270, 515 N.E.2d at 48 (citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
614 (1971)). If a statute is challenged for unconstitutional vagueness on its face, it will be
held unconstitutional only if it is "incapable of any valid application." Id. (citing Steffel
v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 (1974)).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 270-71, 515 N.E.2d at 48-49. The court applied common sense and reasoned that the legislature could not have intended a new definition of force that would be
so broad as to include all,conceivable notions of the word. Id. at 270, 515 N.E.2d at 48.
The court further explained that the statute should be given a construction consistent
with legislative purposes and policies in enacting it. Id. at 270-71, 515 N.E.2d at 49.
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that the sexual act involve force, with the criminal sexual assault
statute. 27" The court further reasoned that the legislature intended
to retain under section 12-13(a)(1) the same meaning of "force"
that existed under the former rape and deviate sexual assault
statutes.271
In Haywood, the defendants argued that the legislature did not
intend to retain the definition of "force" in the repealed statutes.272
Specifically, they argued that although the prior rape statute required a showing of force against the victim's will, 27 3 the current

statute does not.274 Similarly, although the prior deviate sexual assault statute required that the victim be "compelled" to perform
the sexual act, 27 5 the legislature did not include this element in the

new statute. 276 Therefore, the defendants argued that the legislature did not intend the term "force" to mean the force that compels an individual to engage in sexual activity against his will, but
rather intended that the victim's state of mind be irrelevant.277
They argued that "force" can be construed to include even the type

of force in the physical act of sexual penetration itself. 27s They
270. Id. at 271, 515 N.E.2d at 49. The Illinois General Assembly repealed large portions of the prior statutes by Public Act 83-1117. Id. The Act's sponsors asserted that
the purpose of the bill was to recodify the sexual offenses so as to criminalize all sexual
assaults without distinguishing between the type of act proscribed and the sex of the
victim or the offender. Id.
271. Id. at 272, 515 N.E.2d at 49. The court relied on two theories to support its
conclusion. First, the court recognized that a statute in derogation of the common law
cannot be construed to change the common law beyond what is expressed by the statute's
words. Id. (citing In re W.W., 97 Ill. 2d 53, 454 N.E.2d 207 (1983)). Second, the court
relied on evidence from the legislative debates that showed the legislature's intent to retain the common law definition of force from the two repealed statutes. Id. at 272-73,
515 N.E.2d at 50 (citing HOUSE PROCEEDINGS, 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., June 14, 1984, at
63)).
272. Id. at 273, 515 N.E.2d at 50.
273. The pertinent section of the former statute provided:
Rape. (a) A male person of the age of 14 years and upwards who has sexual
intercourse with a female, not his wife, by force and against her will, commits
rape.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-1 (1983)(repealed 1984)(emphasis added).
274. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 273, 515 N.E.2d at 50. The former rape and deviate
sexual assault statutes were replaced by the criminal sexual assault statute. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-13 (1987). See supra note 256 for the relevant portion of this
statute.
275. The relevant portion of the former statute provided: "Any person of the age 14
or upwards, who by force or threat of force, compels any other person to perform or
submit to any act of deviate sexual conduct commits deviate sexual assault." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-1 (1983)(repealed 1984)(emphasis added).
276. Haywood, 118 11. 2d at 273, 515 N.E.2d at 50.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 273-74, 515 N.E.2d at 50.
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claimed that under this interpretation, any act of sexual penetration, even consensual, fits within the offense of criminal sexual
assault.279
The court rejected the defendant's assertion that the victim's
consent is irrelevant in determining whether an offense was committed. 280 The court concluded that a person of common intelligence and experience could distinguish between sexual acts
accomplished by force, as proscribed in the statute and sexual activity between consenting adults. 28 I Therefore, it held that section
12-13(a)(1) satisfies the due process requirements.282
Next, the court addressed the trial courts' determinations that
the definition of "bodily harm," as described in the aggravated
criminal sexual assault statute, lacked an objective standard as to
the type of bodily harm that constitutes a statutory violation.283
The lower courts reasoned that because the statute does not designate a specific type of bodily harm, a physical invasion of the anatomy by4 the simple act of sexual penetration can constitute bodily
harm.

28

The supreme court rejected the trial courts' construction of
"physical harm" and relied on the "well-known legal meaning" of
the term.28 5 The court noted that it had previously considered the
definition of "bodily harm" in the context of a battery statute and
concluded that it could properly apply the same meaning to bodily
harm in section 12-14.286
The court concluded that the term "bodily harm" is consistent
279. Id.
280. Id. The court reasoned that although the prosecution need not formally prove
nonconsent, if the prosecution shows that there was an act of sexual penetration by force,
then this evidence demonstrates the nonconsensual nature of the act. Id. at 274, 515
N.E.2d at 50.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 275-77, 515 N.E.2d at 50-52. The statute defines "bodily harm" as "physical harm, and includes, but is not limited to, sexually transmitted disease, pregnancy and
impotence." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-12(b)(1987).
284. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 276, 515 N.E.2d at 51.
285. Id. The court noted that when a Statute contains language with a generally
understood legal meaning, the court will assume that the legislature intended that meaning. Id.
286. Id. at 276-77, 515 N.E.2d at 51. Specifically, it concluded that the definition
requires temporary or permanent physical damage to the body. Id. The court cited People v. Mays, 91 Ill. 2d 251, 256, 437 N.E.2d 633 (1982), in which the court stated:
"Although it may be difficult to pinpoint exactly what constitutes bodily harm for the
purposes of the statute, some sort of physical pain or damage to the body, like lacerations,
bruises or abrasions, whether temporary or permanent is required." Id. at 256, 437
N.E.2d at 635-36.
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with the commonly understood meaning and, therefore, is definite
enough to meet the requirements of due process.2 87 The court
stated that the trial courts erred in holding the section unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. The court reversed and remanded
the judgments of the circuit courts of Fayette and Marion
Counties.288
5.

Aggravated Arson

In People v. Orange,2 89 a jury convicted Leroy Orange of murder,
concealment of a homicidal death, and aggravated arson. 290 The
defendant confessed that he tied up, gagged, and then stabbed
three adults and a ten-year-old child. 29 ' He set two fires in the
victims' apartment before leaving. 292 The trial judge sentenced Orange to death.293
On appeal, the court readily accepted the defendant's argument
that it must reverse the aggravated arson conviction because the
statute under which the defendant was charged subsequently had
been declared unconstitutional.294 The court thus reversed the defendant's aggravated arson conviction.295
287. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 277, 515 N.E.2d at 52.
288. Id. at 277, 515 N.E.2d at 51.
289. 121 11. 2d 364, 521 N.E.2d 69 (1988).
290. Id. at 369, 521 N.E.2d at 71.
291. Id. Although the defendant confessed in a statement to the police, at trial he
denied any involvement in these crimes. Id. at 370, 521 N.E.2d at 72.
292. Id. at 370, 521 N.E.2d at 72.
293. Id. at 369, 521 N.E.2d at 71. The court stayed the defendant's execution pending direct appeal. Id.
294. Id. at 392 521 N.E.2d at 82. The defendant in Orange was charged under section 20.1-1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20.1l(a)(1)(1983). The statute provided in relevant part that: "(a) A person commits aggravated arson when in the course of committing arson he knowingly damages, partially or
totally, any building or structure, and (1) he knows or reasonably should know that one
Id.
I..."
or more persons are present therein .
The Orange court relied on the Illinois Supreme Court's finding that the aggravated
arson statute was unconstitutional. People v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 69, 499 N.E.2d 470
(1986). In Johnson, the State charged Gary Johnson with aggravated arson and alleged
that he knowingly damaged a building by fire and had reason to know that someone was
present within the building. Id. at 69-70, 499 N.E.2d at 471. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the charge, holding that section 20. l(a)(l) unconstitutionally violated the defendant's due process rights because it failed to define the
underlying offense committed. Id. at 72-73, 499 N.E.2d at 472. See also People v. Clark,
114 Ill. 2d 450, 501 N.E.2d 123 (1986) (supreme court followed its reasoning in Johnson
and reversed the defendant's aggravated arson conviction).
295. Orange, 121 Ill. 2d. at 392, 521 N.E.2d at 82. The defendant also raised many
procedural challenges. For a discussion of these arguments, see Carey & Feeley, Criminal Procedure, 20 Loy. U. CHL L.J. 391, 423 (1989). With the exception of the aggravated arson charge, the court rejected the defendant's other challenges and affirmed the
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The court, however, rejected the defendant's related argument
that the invalidity of the aggravated arson conviction necessitated a
new sentencing hearing.296 The court reasoned that because the
trial judge based the defendant's death penalty sentence on the
multiple murders, the reversal of the arson conviction was irrelevant to the death sentence. 297 The court ordered the defendant executed by lethal injection.298
6.

The Drug Paraphernalia Act

In People v. Monroe,29 9 the court considered the constitutionality
of the Drug Paraphernalia Act (the "Act"). 3° ° The defendants,
Louis Monroe and Ellis Levin, were charged in separate actions for
violations of the Act. 30 ' The trial court consolidated the two cases
30 2
the Act was unconstitutionally vague.
and ultimately held3 0that
3
The State appealed.
The defendants contended that the Act was unconstitutionally
vague because the definition of drug paraphernalia in section 2(d)
of the Act and the penalty provision in section 3(a) contained contradictory requisite mental states. 3° Specifically, the defendants
argued that section 2(d) required actual knowledge,30 5 while secdefendant's convictions for murder and concealment of a homicidal death. The court
also affirmed the trial court's sentence of death. Orange, 121 Ill. 2d at 393, 521 N.E.2d at
82.
296. Orange, 121 Ill. 2d at 392-93, 521 N.E.2d at 82.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 393, 521 N.E.2d at 82. Justice Simon dissented from the majority's consideration of the defendant's challenge based on the ineffectiveness of counsel at his resentencing hearing. Id. at 393-400, 521 N.E.2d at 82-86 (Simon, J., dissenting). Justice
Simon also reiterated his opposition to the constitutionality of the death penalty. Id. at
400, 521 N.E.2d at 86 (Simon, J., dissenting).
299. 118 Ill. 2d 298, 515 N.E.2d 42 (1987).
300. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, paras. 2101 - 2107 (1985).
301. Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d at 299, 515 N.E.2d at 42.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 301, 515 N.E.2d at 43.
305. Id. at 302, 515 N.E.2d at 43 The statute provided in pertinent part:
(d) Drug Paraphernalia means all equipment, products and materials of any
kind which arepeculiar to and marketed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing,
containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing
into the human body cannabis or a controlled substance in violation of the
'Cannabis Control Act' or the 'Illinois Controlled Substances Act.'
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 2102(d) (1985)(emphasis added).

19891

Criminal Law

tion 3(a) required only constructive knowledge. 30 6 The defendants
contended that these contradictory mental states made the Act unconstitutionally vague.3 °7
The State argued that the requirement of constructive knowledge in the penalty section did not negate, but rather strengthened
the scienter requirement in the definition section. 30 8 Thus, the
State argued that the offense is committed when one knows, or
under the circumstances reasonably should have known, that he is
marketing an item for use as drug paraphernalia.30 9
The court rejected the State's argument, finding its interpretation of the two conflicting mental states illogical. 310 The court relied on a United States Court of Appeals finding that the use of the
phrase "marketed for use" included a scienter requirement because
one who marketed for a particular use clearly intended that use. 311
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that because the definition
section of the Drug Paraphernalia Act required actual knowledge
and the penalty section required only constructive knowledge, the
Act did not clearly proscribe the prohibited conduct.31 2 Thus,
the Act failed 313to provide due process of law and was
unconstitutional.
306. Monroe, 118 I11.2d at 301, 515 N.E.2d at 43. This section of the statute provided that a violation of the Act occurred when:
(a) Any person who keeps for sale, offers for sale, sells or delivers for any commercial consideration any item which that person knows, or under all of the
circumstances reasonably should have known, to be drug paraphernalia, commits a business offense for which a fine of $1,000.00 shall be imposed for each
item.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 2103(a) (1985)(emphasis added).
307. Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d at 302, 515 N.E.2d at 43.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 304, 515 N.E.2d at 44.
311. Id. at 302-03, 515 N.E.2d at 43-44 The State relied on Camille Corp. v. Phares,
705 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1983). In Camille Corp., the court held that actual and constructive knowledge standards can be reconciled in a drug paraphernalia act. Id. at 230-31.
The Camille Corp. court considered an East Moline, Illinois, drug paraphernalia ordinance that required scienter in the definition section and only constructive knowledge in
the penalty section. The Camille Corp. court upheld the statute, reasoning that the sections could be read together so as to "require both that the violator intended the object for
use with illegal drugs and also at least had reason to know that the transferee contemplated such illegal usage." Id. at 230 (emphasis in original).
The Monroe court, however, distinguished Camille Corp. It found that the ordinance
in question in that case "permitted constructive knowledge only in regards to the [transferee's] intentions . . . whereas under the [Illinois] Act[,] constructive knowledge [was]
permitted to redefine the [seller's] mental state requirement." Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d at 30405, 515 N.E.2d at 44-45.
312. Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d at 305, 515 N.E.2d at 45.
313. Id.
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Sexual Relations Within Families

3 14 the Illinois Supreme Court determined
In People v. Parker,
that the sexual relations within families statute3' 5 applies to stepparent-stepchild relationships.3" 6 In Parker, the defendant admitted, in response to police questioning, that his eighteen-year-old
stepson performed oral sex on him twice. 317 The trial court convicted the defendant of the offense of sexual relations within families. 318 The appellate court reversed the lower court and held that
the statute is ambiguous.31 9
Upon appeal by the State, the supreme court rejected the defendant's argument that the statute does not prohibit sexual conduct
between a stepparent and a stepchild over seventeen years of age.32°
The court focused on the legislative intent and determined that
although the statute does not expressly use the word "stepparents," this category is included within the group of persons subject
to the statute.321
The court also relied on a 1986 amendment to the statute to
determine the legislative intent.322 The court reasoned that the
amendment provided a more expansive definition of persons sub314. 123 Ill. 2d 204, 526 N.E.2d 135 (1988).
315. The statute under which the lower court convicted the defendant provided:
(a) A person commits sexual relations within families if he or she:
(1) Commits an act of sexual penetration as defined in Section 12-12 of this
Code; and
(2) The person knows that he or she is related to the other person as follows:
(i) Brother or sister, either of the whole blood or the half blood; or (ii) Father or
mother, when the child or stepchild, regardless of legitimacy and either of the
whole blood or half blood or by adoption, was 18 years of age or over when the
act was committed.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-11 (a)(1985)(emphasis added).
316. Parker, 123 Ill. 2d at 213-14, 526 N.E.2d at 139.
317. Id. at 207, 526 N.E.2d at 136.
318. Id. at 206, 526 N.E.2d at 136.
319. Id. at 207, 526 N.E.2d at 136. See People v. Parker, 152 Ill. App. 3d 732, 504
N.E.2d 1003 (3d Dist. 1987).
320. Parker, 123 Ill. 2d at 211, 526 N.E.2d at 138.
321. Id. at 210, 526 N.E.2d at 137-38. The court relied on prior cases holding that as
long as the court could ascertain the legislative purpose from a statute, it could modify or
add words to eliminate inconsistency with the legislative intent. Id. at 210-11, 526
N.E.2d at 138. See People v. Bratcher, 63 Ill. 2d 534, 349 N.E.2d 31 (1976); People v.
Scott, 57 Ill. 2d 353, 312 N.E.2d 596 (1974); Community Consol. School Dist. No. 210 v.
Mini, 55 Ill. 2d 382, 304 N.E.2d 75 (1973).
322. Parker, 123 Ill. 2d at 211-12, 526 N.E.2d at 138. The amendment added the
underscoredportion below: "(a) A person commits sexual relations within families if he
or she is related to the other person as follows: ... (iii) Stepfather or stepmother, when the
child was 18 years or over when the act was committed." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1111 (a)(2)(Supp. 1986)(emphasis added).
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ject to the statute, but did not create a new offense.3 2 3 The court
rejected the defendant's argument that the amendment substantively changed the law. 324 Although the court recognized that an
amendatory change creates a presumption that the amendment
was intended to change the former law,3 25 it stated that3 the
legisla26
ture also may amend a law to simply clarify its intent.
The court next considered the defendant's argument that the
language creates an ambiguous conflict.327 The defendant argued
that the word "stepchild" is inconsistent with the phrase "regardless of legitimacy
and either of the whole or half blood or by
32
adoption. 1
The court, however, found no ambiguity.329 It reasoned that the
terms "half-blood," "whole-blood," and "legitimacy" were all inapplicable references to the word "stepchild" because those terms
could only describe the relationship of a child to its parents or siblings.33 ° The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and
reversed the appellate court.3 3
8.

Feticide

In People v. Shum, 3 3 2 the court considered the constitutionality
of the feticide statute.333 A jury convicted Keith Shum of the murder of Gwendolyn Whipple, the attempted murder of Theresa Con323. Parker, 123 Il1. 2d at 212, 526 N.E.2d at 139.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 211, 526 N.E.2d at 138.
326. Id. at 212, 526 N.E.2d at 139.
327. Id. at 212-13, 526 N.E.2d at 139.
328. Id. at 212, 526 N.E.2d at 139. For the complete text of this statute, see supra
note 315.
329. Parker, 123 Ill. 2d at 213, 526 N.E.2d at 139.
330. Id. The court reiterated that if the court can ascertain the legislature's intent,
then it can declare some words surplusage to carry out the legislative intent. Id. (citing
People v. Todd, 59 I11.
2d 534, 543, 322 N.E.2d at 447, 453 (1975)).
331. Id. at 214, 526 N.E.2d at 139. In a special concurrence, Justice Clark disagreed
with the majority's reliance on the subsequent amendment; he believed that the court
must limit itself to the interpretation of the statute in effect at the time of the offense. Id.
at 214, 526 N.E.2d at 139-40 (Clark, J., concurring). Justice Clark argued that the issue
is whether the statute sufficiently warns the defendant of its proscribed activities. Id. at
215, 526 N.E.2d at 140 (Clark, J., concurring). He reasoned that because the term
"stepchild" necessarily implies the existence of a stepparent, the statute is not ambiguous,
and thus fairly warned the defendant. Id. at 216, 526 N.E.2d at 140 (Clark, J., concurring). He conceded that the statute is imprecise, but stated that imprecision does not
necessarily "equate with ambiguity," and it does not invalidate a statute or "necessitate
reliance on subsequent statutory amendments." Id. (Clark, J., concurring).
332. 117 Ill. 2d 317, 512 N.E.2d 1183 (1987).
333. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.1 (1981)(repealed 1986). The statute provided
in pertinent part:
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way, and the feticide of Whipple's unborn baby. 334 The court
sentenced the defendant to death on the murder charge and to concurrent prison terms for the feticide, rape, and attempted murder
convictions.335 The defendant appealed to the supreme court.336
The evidence revealed that the defendant fired five bullets at
Whipple, striking her skull, forehead, and left shoulder. 337 The defendant then fled.338 A paramedic, who arrived soon after the
shooting, detected no vital signs or heartbeats in either Whipple or
her unborn child.339 A trial expert testified that the bullet that entered Whipple's skull caused her death.3 " The fetus died from the
intrauterine asphyxia caused by the mother's death. 34 ' Two doctors testified that the full-term fetus was capable of surviving
outside of the mother's womb at the time of the incident. 42
On appeal, the defendant raised five questions regarding the con(a) A person commits the offense of feticide who causes the death of a fetus if,
in performing the acts which cause the death, he, without lawful justification:
(1) either intended to kill or do great bodily harm to the mother carrying the
fetus or knew that such acts would cause death or great bodily harm to the
mother; or
(2) he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm to the mother; or
(3) he was attempting to or committing a forcible felony against the mother
other than voluntary manslaughter; and
(4) he knew, or reasonably should have known under all of the circumstances,
that the mother was pregnant.
(b) For purposes of this Section, 'fetus' means a fetus which the physician or
pathologist performing the fetal autopsy determines, based upon the particular
facts of the case before him, to have been capable, at the time of its death, of
sustained life outside of the mother's womb with or without life support equipment, and such capacity for sustained life is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
334. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 332, 512 N.E.2d at 1187.
335. Id. at 332-33, 512 N.E.2d at 1187. The court imposed a prison term of 60 years
for the feticide and 30 years each for the rape of Whipple, the rape of Conway, and the
attempted murder of Conway. Id. at 337, 512 N.E.2d at 1189.
336. Id. at 333, 512 N.E.2d at 1187.
337. Id. at 334-35, 512 N.E.2d at 1188. On July 6, 1982, the defendant visited the
apartment that Whipple, Conway, and Conway's three children shared. Id. at 333, 521
N.E.2d at 1187. Conway had previously become acquainted with the defendant through
her boyfriend. Id. When Conway and the defendant argued, the defendant became angry
and poked Conway's face with an umbrella tip. Id. Conway responded by grabbing a
knife. Id. The defendant pulled out a gun and forced the women to lie next to each other
across a bed. He undressed and raped each woman, and then forced them to perform
oral sex on him. He then aimed the gun alternatively at each woman, threatening to kill
them. Id. at 333-34, 521 N.E.2d at 1187.
338. Id. at 335, 512 N.E.2d at 1188.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 336-37, 512 N.E.2d at 1189.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 337, 512 N.E.2d at 1189.
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stitutionality of the feticide statute: whether the statute adequately
defines the stage at which culpability is triggered; whether the statute arbitrarily allows unqualified physicians to conduct the autopsy
on the fetus; whether the statue expresses a policy wholly inconsistent with Illinois' abortion statute; whether the statute distinguishes between the mens rea requirements for murder and feticide
in an arbitrary and irrational manner; and whether the statute arbitrarily fails to reflect the legislature's expressed intent.34 3
The defendant first argued that the statute failed to adequately
warn a person of ordinary intelligence of the proscribed conduct
because the definition of "fetus" is based on shifting medical opinion as to viability of the fetus. 3" The court concluded, however,
that there could be no shifting medical opinion as to whether
Whipple's fetus could sustain life outside the womb 34 5 because evidence showed that the fetus was full-term and that Whipple was in
the early stages of labor at the time of the murder.346 Consequently, the court concluded that Shum lacked standing to make
this claim because he was not within the class of people who could
challenge the statute's definitions.3 47
The court similarly concluded that the defendant lacked standing to make the second constitutional challenge that the statute
arbitrarily allows unqualified doctors to conduct the fetal autopsy. 348 Because a Cook County deputy medical examiner who
specialized in pathology performed the autopsy, the court concluded that the defendant was not within the class of defendants as
to whom the law is purportedly unconstitutional.3 4 9
The defendant's third challenge concerned the alleged inconsistency between the feticide statute and the Illinois Abortion Law of
1975 .350 The defendant noted that the legislature's policy as de343. Id. at 357, 512 N.E.2d at 1199. The defendant also raised various procedural
challenges, all of which the court rejected. See Carey & Feeley, CriminalProcedure, 20
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. -, - (1989).
344. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 358, 512 N.E.2d at 1199.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. The court relied on precedent in which it stated that "[a] party who would
attack a statute as unconstitutional must bring himself within the class as to whom the
law is unconstitutional." Id. (citing Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz, 63 Ill. 2d
499, 510-11, 349 N.E.2d 61, 67 (1976) (quoting People v. Bombacino, 51 Ill. 2d 17, 19-20,
280 N.E.2d 687, 699 (1972))).
348. Id. See supra note 333 for the text of section (b) of the statute referred to in the
defendant's argument.
349. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 358, 512 N.E.2d at 1199.
350. Id. at 358-59, 512 N.E.2d at 1199. The abortion law indicates that:
It is the intention of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois to reasonably
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fined by the abortion law is to protect the right to life of the unborn
child from the point of conception.3 5 1 He argued that the feticide

statute conflicts with the state policy by excluding from prosecution persons who harm the fetus after conception but prior to the
point of viability.35 2 Because the statute cannot be reconciled with
the policy expressed in the Illinois Abortion Act, he contended
that the court must find it to be unconstitutional.353
The court rejected this argument on several grounds.354 First, it
noted that the statutes do not address the same interests. 35 5 The

United States Supreme Court has constitutionally protected the
right to abort.356 By contrast, the feticide statute attempts to protect a pregnant woman and her unborn child from the intentional
harm caused by a third party.357 Second, the court held that the
policy statement from the abortion law on which the defendant
relied3 5 indicated a policy that the legislature recognized as impermissible under United States Supreme Court decisions. 359 The
court concluded that no inconsistency existed between the two
regulate abortion in conformance with the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court of January 22, 1973. Without in any way restricting the right of
privacy of [the] woman or the right of a woman to an abortion under those
decisions, the General Assembly of the State of Illinois do solemnly declare and
find in reaffirmation of the long standing policy of this State, that the unborn
child is a human being from the time of conception and is, therefore, a legal
person for purposes of the unborn child's right to life and is entitled to the right
of life from conception under the laws and Constitution of this State.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-21 (1981).
351. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 358, 512 N.E.2d at 1199.
352. Id. at 358-59, 512 N.E.2d at 1199. See supra note 333 for the legislature's definition of fetus. The statute does not penalize one who caused the death of a fetus that was
not yet capable of sustaining life outside the womb.
353. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 358-59, 512 N.E.2d at 119.
354. Id. at 359, 512 N.E.2d at 1199.
355. Id.
356. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 147-56 (1973)).
357. Id. at 359, 512 N.E.2d at 1199-1200.
358. See supra note 312 for the text of the policy statement behind the Abortion Law
of 1975.
359. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 359, 512 N.E.2d at 1200 The relevant portion of this policy
statement provided:
[T]he General Assembly finds and declares that the longstanding policy of this
State to protect the right to life of the unborn child from conception by prohibiting abortion unless necessary to preserve the life of the mother is impermissible only because of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and that,
therefore, if those decisions of the United States Supreme Court are ever reversed or modified or the United States Constitution is amended to allow protection of the unborn then the former policy of this State to prohibit abortions
unless necessary for the preservation of the mother's life shall be reinstated.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-21 (1981).
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statutes. 36
Shum next argued that the distinctions between the mens rea
requirements for feticide and murder are irrational and arbitrary.3 6 ' Specifically, he noted that the mens rea requirement for
murder may be directed either at the decedent or at another,3 6 2
whereas the mens rea for feticide must be directed only at the
mother.3 6 3 In addition, Shum argued that because the feticide statute excludes voluntary manslaughter and reckless homicide, this
distinction is irrational as well. a6
The court disagreed with the defendant's argument, finding that
the distinctions between feticide and murder are logical. 365 The
court reasoned that because one can be charged with feticide only
when he knew or reasonably should have known that the woman
was pregnant, the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply.3 6 6
Further, the legislature rationally limited feticide to cases in which
the offender intended to harm the mother because it is unlikely that
one could kill a fetus without intending to harm the mother.3 67
The court also determined that the legislature logically excluded
cases of voluntary manslaughter and reckless conduct because
these require a less culpable mental state than required by the feticide statute.3 6 s
Finally, the court considered Shum's contention that the statute
fails to reflect the legislature's expressed intent. 369 The defendant
360. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 359, 512 N.E.2d at 1200.
361. Id. at 359-60, 512 N.E.2d at 1200.
362. Id. at 360, 512 N.E.2d at 1200. The murder statute provides that one who kills
another without legal justification commits murder if:
(1) He either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to the individualor another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-(a)(l), 9-1(a)(2) (1987) (emphasis added).
363. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 360, 512 N.E.2d at 1200. The relevant parts of the statute
provide that the offense of feticide occurs when the offender:
(1) either intended to kill or do great bodily harm to the mother carrying the
fetus or knew that such acts would cause death or great bodily harm to the
mother; or (2) he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to the mother; or (3) he was attempting or committing a
forcible felony against the mother other than voluntary manslaughter ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 9-1.1(a)(1) to (a)(3)(1987)(emphasis added).
364. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 360, 512 N.E.2d at 1200.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 361, 512 N.E.2d at 1200.
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noted that the legislative debates indicate an intention to limit culpability to knowing conduct.3 7 ° He argued that because the statute
provides for culpability when the offender knew or reasonably
should have known that the woman was pregnant, the statute does
not adequately express the true legislative intent.371 The court
completely rejected this argument. It found it sufficiently clear
that culpability arises whenever the defendant knows or reasonably
should have known that the woman is pregnant.37 2 Consequently,
any other aid to construction, includthe court refused to refer to
373
ing the legislative debates.
The defendant further argued that even if the statute survived
constitutional scrutiny, the evidence failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because it failed to establish that he knew
that Whipple was pregnant.374 The court rejected this argument,
relying on evidence that Whipple was nine months pregnant on the
day of the murders and that the full-term fetus was within normal
weight limits. 3 5 The court also considered that the defendant
knew Whipple four or five months prior to the incident. A photograph of Whipple taken before her pregnancy showed that she had
not been obese prior to the pregnancy. 376 Finally, the court relied
on Conway's statement that the defendant saw Whipple naked
from the waist down on the day of the crime when he undressed
and raped her. 77 The court inferred from the evidence that the
defendant reasonably should have known that Whipple was
pregnant.37 s
The defendant next argued that the facts raised a reasonable
doubt as to whether Whipple's fetus was capable of sustained life
outside of the mother's womb at the time of its death. 379 The court
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
2d 138, 445 N.E.2d 1174 (1983)(in determin373. Id. (citing People v. Boykin, 94 I11.
ing legislative intent, courts should first consider the statutory language)).
374. Id.
375. Id. at 361, 512 N.E.2d at 1201.
376. Id. at 361-62, 512 N.E.2d at 1201.
377. Id. at 362, 512 N.E.2d at 1201.
378. Id. The court recognized that the evidence supporting the defendant's knowledge of the pregnancy was circumstantial. Id. It stated, however, that it was entitled to
draw inferences from the evidence that could sustain a conviction. Id. (citing People v.
Evans, 87 Ill. 2d 77, 429 N.E.2d 520 (1981); People v. Williams, 40 Ill. 2d 522, 240
N.E.2d 645 (1968)).
379. Id. The defendant suggested three indicators that the fetus was not viable: the
fetus's below average birth weight; the deputy examiner's external autopsy; and Whippie's previous miscarriage. Id.
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rejected Shum's assertions, however, and relied upon medical testimony from the deputy medical examiner and a doctor, both of
whom believed that the fetus was capable of surviving outside the
womb and that there were no abnormalities.38 °
Finally, the defendant argued that because the feticide conviction arose from the single act of killing Whipple, the court must
reverse the feticide conviction.3 "' The defendant contended that
the court could only convict Shum on the more serious offense of
the murder of Whipple.3 82 The court rejected the defendant's argument on several grounds.3 83 First, the court recognized two distinct victims of Shum's actions: Whipple and her unborn child. 8 4
The court then concluded that Illinois law required separate convictions for separate victims.

385

Second, the court concluded that

because the offense of feticide is not a lesser included offense of
murder, both convictions could stand.386 Consequently, the court
affirmed the trial court's judgment and ordered the defendant executed by lethal injection.387
III.

LEGISLATION

A. Jurisdiction
Public Act 85-740, effective January 1, 1988, amended the state
criminal jurisdiction statute 318 to allow prosecution for felony mur380. Id. at 362-63, 512 N.E.2d at 1201. The medical examiner and the doctor testified that the fetus's weight was within the normal range, that the fetus developed without
genetic abnormalities, and that the condition that resulted in Whipple's prior miscarriage
was absent in this pregnancy. Id.
381. Id. at 363, 512 N.E.2d at 1201.
382. Id. The defendant relied on People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 363 N.E.2d 838
(1977)(the defendant was charged with rape and burglary with intent to commit rape for
the assault of a victim).
383. Id. at 363-64, 512 N.E.2d at 1201-02.
384. Id. at 363, 512 N.E.2d at 1201. In contrast, the defendant in King committed
two offenses against a single victim. King, 66 Ill. 2d at 552, 363 N.E.2d at 839.
385. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 363, 512 N.E.2d at 1201 (citing People v. Butler, 64 Ill. 2d
485, 356 N.E.2d 330 (1976)).
386. Id. at 363-64, 512 N.E.2d at 1202. The court noted that in order to classify an
offense as a lesser included offense of another, "all the elements of the lesser offense must
be included within the greater offense." Id. at 363, 512 N.E.2d at 1202 (quoting People v.
Smith, 78 Ill. 2d 298, 306, 399 N.E.2d 1289 (1980)). Applying this standard, the court
reasoned that because the feticide statute required the death of a fetus and the murder
statute did not, feticide could not be a lesser included crime of murder. Id. at 363-64, 512
N.E.2d at 1202.
387. Id. at 374-75, 512 N.E.2d at 1207. Justice Simon's dissent advocated a reversal
based on a procedural issue. Id. at 375, 512 N.E.2d at 1207 (Simon, J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Clark joined in the dissent. Id. (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
388. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1-5 (1985).
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der in Illinois if the underlying felony was committed in Illinois.38 9
B.

Limitations Periods

The Illinois General Assembly passed several public acts relating to the statute of limitations period. Public Act 85-673, effective
January 1, 1988, added the offense of reckless homicide to those
which the general statutes of limitation do not apply and for which
prosecution may begin at any time. ag°
Public Act 85-441, effective January 1, 1988, provides that the
prosecution for an offense involving sexual conduct or penetration,
when the defendant and victim are in a fiduciary relationship at the
time of the offense, may be commenced within one year after the
discovery of the offense.39 '
C. Intoxicated Condition as Defense
Public Act 85-670, effective January 1, 1988, amended the statute that created an intoxicated or drugged state as an affirmative
defense.3 92 The amendment provides that a drugged or intoxicated
person is criminally responsible for his conduct unless his condition suspends his powers of reason and renders him unable to form
the required specific intent. 93
D. Murder
The Illinois General Assembly effected several changes to the
murder statutes. Effective July 1, 1988, Public Act 85-1003 created the offense of solicitation of murder. 94 One who commands,
encourages, or requests another person to commit murder with the
intent that first degree murder be committed, commits a class X
felony. 395 The statute provides that the term of imprisonment shall
not be less than fifteen years or more than thirty years.3 96
Public Act 85-1003 also created the offense of solicitation of
murder for hire.397 One commits this offense when, with the intent
389. ILL. REV.
390. ILL. REV.
391. ILL. REV.
392. ILL. REV.
393. ILL. REV.
that the intoxicated
3 (1985).
394. ILL. REV.
395. ILL. REV.
396. ILL. REV.
397. ILL. REV.

ch.
ch.
ch.
ch.
ch.
condition

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

ch.
ch.
ch.
ch.

38, para. 1-5 (b)(1987).
38, para. 3-5(a)(1987).
38, para. 3-6(e) (1987).
38, para. 6-3 (1985).
38, para. 6-3(a)(1987). The former statute required only
negated the mental state. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 638,
38,
38,
38,

paras. 8-1.1, 8-1.2 (1987).
para. 8-1.1 (1987).
para. 8-1.1(b) (1987).
para. 8-1.2 (1987).
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that first degree murder be committed, he forms a contract or
agreement with another to murder for money or other value.398
The statute classifies the offense as a class X felony and provides a
term of imprisonment of not less than twenty years and not more
than forty years.3 99
The Illinois General Assembly also amended the aggravating
factors under the first degree murder statute. 4°° Effective January
1, 1988, Public Act 85-404 provides that an aggravating factor for
the death penalty exists when the defendant is convicted of murdering two or more individuals as a result of the same act or separate acts, as long as the defendant knew that his acts would cause
death or created the strong probability of death or great bodily
harm. 40' The amendment also eliminated the requirement that the
acts be premeditated." 2
E.

Children

The Illinois General Assembly responded to the continuing
problem of the sexual abuse of children by expanding the sexual
assault statutes to provide greater protection for children. Public
Act 85-1003, effective January 1, 1988, expanded the criminal sexual assault statute," 3 making it criminal for any "person responsible for the child's welfare" to commit an act of sexual penetration
with the child under eighteen years of age.'
A person responsible
for a child's welfare commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if
he commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who is under
eighteen years of age." 5
Public Act 85-1003 added a new paragraph to both the criminal
sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse statutes defining the phrase "person responsible for child's welfare."' 4 0 6 This cat-

egory includes the child's foster parent, guardian, school teacher,
7
4
or any other caregiver. 0

398. Id.
399. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-1.2(b) (1987). Public Act 85-1003, effective July
1, 1988, amended the solicitation act to exclude first degree murder from its purview
because solicitation to commit first degree murder is covered by the new solicitation for
murder statute. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-1.1 (1987).
400. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b)(1987).
401. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b)(3) (1987).
402. Id.
403. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-13 (1985).
404. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-13(a)(3)(1987).
405. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16(b) (1987).
406. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 12-13(a)(3), 12-16(b) (1987).
407. Id.
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Public Act 85-365, effective January 1, 1988, created the offense
of permitting the sexual abuse of a child. ° s This act punishes a
parent or step-parent who either permitted an act of criminal sexual abuse or assault to be committed against his child or who failed
to reasonably prevent its commission. °9 The act defines "child" as
minor under seventeen years of age.410 A violation of this act is a
41 1
class A misdemeanor.
Public Act 85-996, effective July 1, 1988, added a provision to
the aggravated battery of a child statute.412 It provides that the
commission of a second or subsequent offense of aggravated child
battery within three years following
a prior conviction or discharge
41 3
constitutes a class 1 felony.
F Aggravated Assault
The Illinois General Assembly amended the offense of aggravated assault three times during the Survey year. Public Act 85691, effective January 1, 1988, enhances an assault charge to aggravated assault when the perpetrator knows that the victim is either
physically handicapped or over sixty years of age.41 4 The Illinois
General Assembly defined "physically handicapped person" as one
who suffers from a permanent and disabling physical characteristic, which resulted from disease, injury, function disorder, or congenital condition.4"
Public Act 85-804, effective January 1, 1988, provides that one
who commits an assault with a device that is substantially similar
in appearance to a firearm commits an aggravated assault.41 6
Public Act 85-780, effective January 1, 1988, provides that one
who discharges a firearm during an assault commits an aggravated
assault.41 7 The act provides that one who violates this section
commits a class 4 felony.41 8
408. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.1 (1987).
409. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.1(a) (1987).
410. Id.
411. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.1(b) (1987).
412. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-4.3 (1987).
413. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-4.3 (a) (1987). The first-time offender of the
statute commits a class 2 felony. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-4.3 (1987).
414. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-2(a)(11), 12-2(a)(12)(1987).
415. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 2-15a (1987).
416. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-2(a)(1)(1987).
417. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-2(a)(13) (1987).
418. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-2(b) (1987). The legislature distinguished this
particular enhancement from assault to aggravated assault from aggravated assaults defined in the other portions of the section, which remain class A misdemeanors. See ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-2(a), 12-2(b)(1987).
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G. Enhancement
The Illinois General Assembly displayed its concern for the protection of elderly and physically handicapped persons when it created enhancement provisions for assault, sexual assault, robbery,
and battery. Public Act 85-691, effective January 1, 1988, provides
that one who knowingly assaults a physically handicapped person
or a person over sixty years of age commits aggravated assault.4 19
The act also amended the aggravated criminal sexual assault and
aggravated criminal sexual abuse statutes.4 20 The amendment provides that one who commits criminal sexual assault on a physically
4 21
handicapped person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault.
Public Act 85-691 amended the aggravated criminal sexual abuse
statute to provide an enhancement of the criminal sexual abuse
statute when one commits an act of criminal sexual abuse against a
physically handicapped person or a person over sixty years of
age.

42 2

Effective July 1, 1988, Public Act 85-996 elevates a battery
charge to aggravated battery when the offender knows that the victim is physically handicapped. 423 The provision defines a physically handicapped person as one who suffers from a permanent
disabling condition, which results424from disease, injury, functional
disorder, or congenital condition.
Finally, the legislature's concern for the elderly and the physically handicapped was demonstrated by its amendment of the robbery statute. 425 The act enhances the penalty for robbery from a
class 2 felony to a class 1 felony when the victim is physically
handicapped or over sixty years of age.426
Public Act 85-691 also added the commission of an offense
against a physically handicapped person to the list of factors in
aggravation.427
419. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-2(a)(1 1), 12-2(1)(12)(1987).
420. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 12-14, 12-16 (1985).
421. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38. para. 12-14(a)(6)(1987). The prior statute mandated
enhancement when the victim was sixty years or older. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1214(a)(5)(1985).
422. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16(a)(3), 12-16(a)(4)(1987).
423. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-4(b)(13) (1987).
424. Id. This definition of physically handicapped also was added to the "General
Definitions" section of the Code. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 2-15a (1987).
425. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 18-1 (1985).
426. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 18-1(b)(1987).
427. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3.2(a)(9) (1987). The prior statute already
made the commission of an offense against a person over 60 years of age a factor in
aggravation. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3.2(a)(8)(1985).
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CriminalHousing Management

Public Act 85-341, effective January 1, 1988, amended the criminal housing management statute.428 The amendment changed the
requisite mental state from "knowing" to "reckless" 429 and rewrote
several phrases so that they would be easier to read. 43 ° A second or
subsequent conviction of this offense is now a class 4 felony.43 '
Public Act 85-384, effective January, 1, 1988, amended the
maintaining public nuisance statute 432 to criminalize the maintenance of a building used in the commission of the offense of crimi4 33
nal housing management.
L

Sex Offenses

During the Survey year, the Illinois General Assembly demonstrated its continuing concern for sexual abuse. Public Act 85-837,
effective January 1, 1988, expanded the criminal sexual assault
statute 434 to provide an enhanced sentence for a second or subsequent offense of criminal sexual assault. 435 A person who has been
convicted previously of criminal sexual assault and who commits a
second offense under any similar statute in Illinois or in another
jurisdiction that is substantially equivalent to or more serious 436
than
If
the crime prohibited in this statute, commits a class X felony.
the State intends to treat the charge as a class X felony, then the
information or indictment charging the person must state the prior
conviction and give notice of the State's intention to treat the
charge as a class X felony.43 7 The prior conviction is not an element of the offense and may not be disclosed to the jury during the
428. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-5.1(1987). The former statute provided in
pertinent part:
(a) A person commits the offense of criminal housing management when, having personal management or control of residential real estate, whether as a legal
or equitable owner ...,he knowingly permits by his gross carelessness or neglect the physical condition or facilities ...to become or remain so deteriorated
that the health or safety of any inhabitant is endangered ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-5.1(a) (1985).
429. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-5.1(a)(1987).
430. Id.
431. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-5.1(b) (1987). A first-time offender of the statute commits a class A misdemeanor. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-5.1(b)(1987).
432. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 37-1 (1987).
433. Id. See supra note 428 for the relevant portion of the criminal housing management statute.
434. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-13 (1985).
435. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-13(b)(1987).
436. Id.
437. Id.
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383

trial.4 38
Public Act 85-651, effective January 1, 1988, enacted several important amendments to the criminal sexual abuse statutes. 41 9 The
amendment entirely eliminated section 12-15(b)(1). 440 The amendment raised the maximum age of the victim from sixteen to seventeen years of age when the accused is under seventeen years of
age. 44 ' The amendment added a new paragraph to the criminal
sexual abuse statute." 2 It provides that the offense is committed
when one commits an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct
when the victim is at least thirteen years of age but under seventeen
years of age and the accused is less than five years older than the
443
victim.
Public Act 85-651 also added a new paragraph to the aggravated
criminal sexual abuse statute. 4'
The act provides that an individual commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse when he commits an
act of sexual conduct using force or threat of force against a victim
who is at least thirteen years old, but less than seventeen years old
when the act is committed." 5
The act also altered the prior statute to provide that when the
accused, who is under seventeen years of age, commits an act of
sexual conduct with force or threat of force on a victim, who is
under seventeen years of age, the accused commits aggravated
44 6
criminal sexual assault.
The act also amended several other factors in the aggravated
criminal sexual abuse act. 44 It makes "sexual conduct" against a
victim punishable as criminal sexual assault. 448 The act also raises
438. Id.
439. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 12-15, 12-16 (1985).
440. The text of the eliminated paragraph provided that one commits sexual criminal
abuse if "the accused was 17 years of age or over and commits an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who was at least 13 years of age but under 16 years
of age when the act was committed." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-15(b)(1)(1985).
441. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-15(b)(2)(1987). Under the prior statute, one
committed criminal sexual abuse when "the accused was under 17 years of age and commits an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who was at least 9 years
of age but under 16 years of age when the act was committed." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 12-15(b)(2) (1985) (emphasis added).
442. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-15(c)(1987).
443. Id.
444. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16(c) (1987).
445. Id.
446. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16(c)(2)(1987). The prior statute set the victim's maximum age at 13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16(c)(2)(1985).
447. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16 (1985).
448. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16(d)(1987). The prior statute only punished
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a victim's maximum age from sixteen to seventeen years of age. 4

9

Public Act 85-688 provides that, effective January 1, 1988, the
court may order one who was convicted under sections 12-13, 1214, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Code to pay all or a portion of the victim's expenses for treatment in addition to any other penalties provided by the respective statutes.45°
J.

Juvenile Delinquency

Public Act 85-906, effective November 23, 1987, created a new
offense: contributing to the criminal delinquency of a juvenile.45'
A person who is at least twenty-one years of age commits this offense when he "solicits, compels or directs" a person under seventeen years of age to commit a felony. 452 There must be a showing
of intent to promote a felony.453
The offender commits a felony one grade higher than the offense
that was committed by the juvenile.4 54 If a juvenile commits first
degree murder or another class X felony, however, then the offender who contributed to the juvenile's criminal delinquency receives the penalty for the first degree murder or the class X
felony.455
K.

Weapons

The Illinois General Assembly showed marked concern for the
use of firearms by amending existing statutes and creating new provisions. Public Act 85-268, effective January 1, 1988, expanded the
unlawful use of weapons statute to include a ballistic knife.456 The
Illinois General Assembly included the possession of the knife
under several circumstances. One commits the offense of unlawful
an accused who committed an act of "sexual penetration." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
12-16(d)(1985).
449. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16(d)(1987). The prior statute provided that
"the accused commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if he or she commits an act of
sexual penetration with a victim who was at least 13 years of age but under 16 years of
age and the accused was at least 5 years older than the victim." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 12-16(d)(1985).
450. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-18(d)(1987). The types of treatment include
"medical, psychiatric, rehabilitative or psychological." Id.
451. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 33D-1 (1987).
452. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 33D-1(a) (1987).
453. Id.
454. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 33D-l(b) (1987).
455. Id.
456. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1(a)(1)(1987). The statute defines ballistic
knife as a "device that propels a knifelike blade as a projectile by means of a coil spring,
elastic material or compressed gas." Id.
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use of weapons when one sells, manufactures, purchases, possesses,
or carries a ballistic knife.4" 7 One who carries or possesses a ballistic knife in a vehicle or on his person, while he is hooded, robed, or
masked so as to conceal his identity also commits this offense.45"
The act also criminalizes the possession of a ballistic knife by one
on the grounds or in a building of any elementary or secondary
school, or any college or university.45 9
Public Act 85-669, effective January 1, 1988, amended the offense of unlawful possession of firearms and firearm ammunition. 4" The legislature deleted the provision that criminalized the
possession of any firearm or firearm ammunition by one who has
been convicted of a felony in Illinois or another state.461
Public Act 85-736, effective September 22, 1987, expanded the
unlawful use of weapons by felons statute462 by adding two new
sections.4 63 The first added section prohibits the possession of any
weapon 464 by one who is confined in an Illinois Department of Cor-

rections penal institution, regardless of that person's intent.465
This section expanded the prior statute, which did not specifically
prohibit possession by prisoners, but rather prohibited the possession of weapons by felons.466 The Illinois General Assembly also
added a section providing an affirmative defense for one whose possession of the weapon was specifically authorized by rule, regulation, or directive of the Illinois Department of Corrections.467
457.

Id.

458. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 38, para. 24-1(a)(9) (1987).

459. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1(a)(12) (1987).
460. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-3.1(a)(3) (1987).
461. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-3.1(1)(3) (1987).
462. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1.1 (1987). The act cited is Senate Bill 1316.
The same act is also cited as House Bill 2093.
463. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1.1(b), 24-1.1(c) (1987).
464. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1.1(b)(1987). The statute specifically prohibits
the use or possession of weapons prohibited under section 24-1 of the Code. Id. The
prohibited weapons include a bludgeon, black jack, slung-shot, sand-club, sand-bag,
metal knuckles, throwing star, switch blade, knife, and ballistic knife. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 24-1(a)(1) (1987).
465. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 23-1.(b) (1987). This act clarified the unlawful use
of weapons by felons statute by specifying that the offender must be incarcerated in a
penal institution that is a facility of the Illinois Department of Corrections. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1.1(d) (1987). The amended statute provides that "[a]ny person
who violates this section while confined in a penal institution, which is a facility of the
Illinois Department of Corrections, is guilty of a Class 1 felony." Id. (emphasis added).
466. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1.1(a)(1985). The prior statute provided that
one who possessed any firearm or firearm ammunition and previously had been convicted
of a felony under the laws of Illinois or any other jurisdiction, committed unlawful use of
weapons by felons. Id.
467. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-1.1(c)(1987).
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Public Act 85-632, effective January 1, 1988, altered the confiscation and disposition of weapons statute.468 When a confiscated
weapon is used as evidence in a criminal trial, upon disposition of
the matter, the court may order the weapon to be transferred to the
state police department for use in laboratory training or any other
purpose that the Department deems appropriate.4 69 The act deleted the paragraph that limited the transfer of the confiscated material to only criminal laboratories.47 °
Public Act 85-755, effective September 23, 1987, created two
new offenses that criminalize the possession of contraband in state
and non-state penal institutions.471 One who possesses an item of
contraband in a non-state penal institution, regardless of his intent,
commits this offense.472 The offense is penalized as a class 4 felony.4 73 The act created an affirmative defense for one who possesses the contraband by authority of a rule, directive, or order of
the institution's governing authority.474
The act similarly created an offense for possession of contraband
in state penal institutions.4 75 One who possesses contraband in a
state penal institution, regardless of his intent for doing so, commits this offense.476 The act created an affirmative defense for the
situation in which an Illinois Department of Corrections rule, order, or directive specifically authorizes the possession. 7
Unlike the penalty for possession of contraband in a non-state
penal institution, the penalty for possession of contraband in a
state penal institution varies with the type of contraband' possessed.4 78 Possession of alcoholic liquor,4 79 cannabis,48 0 controlled
468. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-6 (1985).
469. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-6(b)(1987).
470. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24-6(b)(1985).
471. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 31A-l, 31A-1.1.(1987).
472. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31 A-l(b) (1987). The prior statute criminalized
the bringing of contraband into a non-state penal institution, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 31A-l(a)(1)(1985)(emphasis added), the causing of another to bring contraband
into a non-state penal institution, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3 1A-l(a)(2) (1985) (emphasis added), and the placingof contraband near the non-State penal institution in order
to give an inmate access to it. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31A-l(a)(3) (1985)(emphasis
added).
473. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31 A-l(d) (1987).
474. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31 A-l(e) (1987).
475. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31 A-l.l(b) (1987).
476. Id.
477. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31 A-l.1(g) (1987).
478. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 31 A-l.l(d) to 31 A-1.1(f) (1987).
479. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31 A-1.1(c)(2)(i) (1987).
480. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31 A-l.l(c)(2)(ii) (1987).
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387

substances,4" 8 ' hypodermic syringes, needles, or other instruments
used for injecting controlled substances or cannabis, 48 2 is a class 4
felony.48 3 Possession of a weapon4 84 is a class 1 felony.4 8 5 Possession of a firearm, 486 firearm ammunition, 4871' or an explosive 488 in a
state penal institution is a class X felony.4 89
L.

False Impersonation of a Peace Officer

Public Act 85-741, effective January 1, 1988, created the offense
of false impersonation of a peace officer.4 9 ° One who knowingly
and falsely represents himself to be a peace officer commits a class
4 felony.4 9 ' One who knowingly and falsely represents himself as a
peace officer while attempting or committing a felony commits aggravated false impersonation of a peace officer.49 2
M.

Money Laundering

Public Act 85-675, effective January 1, 1988, created the offense
of money laundering. 493 One who knowingly engages or attempts
to engage in the transaction of "criminally derived property" commits this offense.4 94 The mental state required is either the intent
to promote the unlawful activity from which the property came or
the knowledge that the transaction was designed to conceal information about the criminally derived property.4 9 5
N

N. C.A.A. Recruitment Violations

Public Act 85-665, effective January 1, 1988, expanded the of481. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31 A-1.1(c)(2)(iii) (1987).
482. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31 A-1.1(c)(2)(iv) (1987).
483. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31 A-1.1(d) (1987).
484. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31 A-l.1(c)(2)(v) (1987).
485. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31 A-l.1(e) (1987).
486. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31 A-l.1(c)(2)(vi) (1987).
487. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31 A-l.1(c)(2)(vii) (1987).
488. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31 A-1.1(c)(2)(vii) (1987).
489. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31 A-1.l(f) (1987).
490. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 32-5.1 (1987).
491. Id.
492. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 32-5.2 (1987). The aggravated offense is penalized
as a class 3 felony. Id.
493. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 29B-1 (1987).
494. Id. The statute defines "criminally derived property" as "any property constituting or derived from proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, pursuant to a violation of
the Criminal Code of 1961, the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or the Cannabis Control Act." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 29B-l(b)(4) (1987).
495. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 29B-l(a) (1987). This offense is penalized as a
class 3 felony. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 29B-1(c) (1987).
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fense of offering a bribe.496 One who offers or promises another
person money or any other item of value or advantage to induce
that person to attend or to refrain from attending a particular institution of secondary or higher education in order to participate or
not participate in interscholastic athletic competition commits this
offense.497 The statute specifically excludes bona fide financial aid,
scholarships, family contributions, and items of de minimis value
that the university provides to any or all students or prospective
students.49
One who offers money or other things of value to an individual
who participates in interscholastic athletics at any institution of
higher education and represents that person in future negotiations
with a professional sports team for employment also commits the
offense of offering a bribe.4 99
0.

Computer Crimes
Public Act 85-926, effective December 1, 1987, demonstrates the
legislature's awareness of the increasing need to control computer
crime. The act created three new offenses5 " and procedures for
the forfeiture of any money, property, or other things of value obtained as a result of the computer fraud."'
One commits the offense of computer tampering when, without
the authorization of the computer's owner, he knowingly accesses
the owner's computer, program, or data, 1 2 obtains data or services
from it,5" 3 damages the computer, or alters, deletes, or removes a
computer program or data . 5 °

The sentence varies with the man-

ner in which the offense is committed. 5
One who accesses another's computer or data commits a class B
misdemeanor. 0

6

One who damages the computer or alters,

496. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 29-1 (1987).
497. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 29-1(b) (1987). This offense is a class A misdemeanor. Id.
498. Id.
499. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 29-1(c) (1987). Either type of action is punishable
as a class A misdemeanor. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 29-1(b), 29-1(c) (1987).
500. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 16D-3, 16D-4, 16D-5 (1987). The act also created a section that defines the terms computer, computer program data, property, access,
services, and vital services or operations. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 16D-2(a) to
16D-2(g) (1987).
501. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16D-6 (1987).
502. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 38, para. 16D-3(a)(1) (1987).
503. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16D-3(a)(2) (1987).
504. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16-D(a)(3) (1987).
505. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 16D-3(b)(1) to 16D-3(b)(3) (1987).
506. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16D-3(b)(1) (1987).
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removes, or deletes its programs commits a class 4 felony.50 7 A

second or subsequent offense of the latter type is a class 3 felony. 08
One commits aggravated computer tampering when he commits
the offense of computer tampering and, in so doing, knowingly disrupts or interferes with the vital operations or services of a state or
local government or public utility.50 9 The offense of aggravated
computer tampering also is committed when one commits the offense of computer tampering and, in so doing, knowingly creates a
strong probability of death or great bodily harm.510
The act also created the offense of computer fraud, which
criminalizes the accessing of a computer, program, or data for the
purpose of fraud or deception. 1' One commits this offense by
knowingly accessing a computer, a program, or data for the purpose of deceiving or defrauding. 1 2 One also commits this offense
by knowingly destroying a computer or altering, deleting, or removing a program
or data for the purpose of deceiving or
13
5

defrauding.

The statute also provides that one who knowingly accesses a
computer, program, or data and, in so doing, obtains money or
control of another's money, property, or services in an effort to
defraud or deceive commits computer fraud. 1 4 If one commits
computer fraud in this manner, then the penalties vary according
to the value of the money, property, or services.5" 5 If the value is
$1000 or less, then the offender is guilty of a class 4 felony.516 If
the value is more than $1000 but less than $50,000, then the offender is guilty of a class 3 felony. 517 If the value of the money,
property, or services equals or exceeds $50,000, then the offender
507. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16D-3(b)(2) (1987).
508. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16D-3(b)(3) (1987).
509. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16D-4(a)(1) (1987). This offense is punishable as
a class 3 felony. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16D-4(b)(1) (1987).
510. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para 16D-4(a)(2) (1987). Aggravated computer tampering committed in this manner is a class 2 felony. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16D4(b)(2) (1987).
511. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16D-5 (1987).
512. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16D-5(a)(1) (1987). This action is punishable as a
class 4 felony. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16D-5(b)(1) (1987).
513. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16D-5(a)(2) (1987). The offense of computer
fraud committed in this manner is penalized as a class 3 felony. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 16D-5(b)(2) (1987).
514. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16D-5(a)(3) (1987).
515. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 16D-5(b)(3)(i) to (b)(3)(iii) (1987).
516. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16D-5(b)(3)(i) (1987).
517. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16D-5(b)(3)(ii) (1987).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 20

commits a class 2 felony.51 8
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although the Illinois Supreme Court and the Illinois General
Assembly addressed a wide variety of criminal law issues during
the Survey period, several new developments can be recognized and
monitored.
The Illinois General Assembly strengthened its continuing resolve to protect persons unable to protect themselves. Responding
to the problem of sexual abuse and exploitation of children, for
example, the general assembly created new offenses and enhanced
existing penalties for crimes involving juvenile victims. The Illinois Supreme Court, within its own role of judicial review, also
expressed its concern in this area. In the Geever decision, the court
upheld the statute prohibiting possession of child pornography
against a number of constitutional challenges. In Parker,the court
expanded the scope of the sexual relations within families statute
by means of authoritative construction.
To assure the physical safety of the elderly and physically handicapped, in turn, the general assembly revised a number of statutes
to mandate stiffer penalties. Indeed, a person's age or physical disability is now a factor that may prompt a harsher sentence for the
commission of any offense within this state.
General public safety concerns were evident in a number of
other measures taken during the Survey year. The supreme court
in Esposito upheld summary license suspension provisions within
the Illinois Vehicle Code aimed at intoxicated motorists. Prison
security was another separate topic under study in the legislature
this year; new statutes prohibiting the possession of contraband
and weapons within the state's prisons were enacted. New and
tougher laws against criminal housing management, money laundering, and computer crime complete the public welfare measures
adopted during the Survey term.

518.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16D-5(b)(3)(iii) (1987).

